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I. INTRODUCTION
The thirtieth anniversary of the passage of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) 1 was marked on June 23, 2002. Title IX is a
federal gender discrimination statute applicable to educational programs and
activities that are recipients of federal funds. The Title IX statute directs, "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ... ."2 Title IX did not expressly provide for a private right of
action, which has been judicially implied.3 The traditional elements needed to
be established in a Title IX action were: (1) an educational program or activity
was involved, 4 (2) that received federal funds,5 and (3) discrimination
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000). See Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of
Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551 (2003) [hereinafter Heckman, The Glass Sneaker].
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
3. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Doe v. Univ. of Ill., 138 F.3d 653,
665 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, judgment vacated, sub nom.; Bd. of Trs. v. Doe, 526 U.S. 1142
(1999), on remand, 200 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 1999).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 553 n.10.
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1681. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 553 n.l 1.
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occurred based on sex. In cases involving sexual harassment, 6 a fourth
element was recently imposed: a notice requirement. This notice requirement
has been applied to cases involving sexual harassment by students against
educational institutions for the alleged actions of teachers or other educational
employees toward students or by fellow students (peer sexual harassment).
Title IX is directed toward seeking redress against the recipient of federal
funds, the educational institution, rather than remedying the officious actions
of the individuals involved, whether it is the school employee7 or fellow
student. Since the administration of the athletic departments at the elementary,
secondary, or post-secondary levels is done by employees of the educational
institutions, the article concentrates on the caselaw involving employees of
educational institutions. This article traverses the litigation landscape
involving Title IX and examines whether this law imposes a notice
requirement in cases pertaining to amateur athletics not involving sexual
harassment.
The Title IX paradigm includes not only the statute, but implementing
regulations, 8 a number of administrative policy documents, 9 as well as the
caselaw. The statutory language does not expressly mention either amateur
athletics or sexual harassment.' 0 While there is also an absence of any
regulations governing sexual harassment,11 there are regulations specifically
directed toward physical education' 2 and educational programs and activities
involving interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, and intramural athletics. 13
Does the presence of the regulations and administration of athletic programs
insulate potential plaintiffs from having to affirmatively first place the
educational institution on notice that a Title IX violation has occurred? 14
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
7. See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 240 F. Supp. 2d 492,498-99 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (exploring
allegations by former female soccer players concerning their male head coach).
8. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2002).
9. See e.g., Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: A Policy Interpretation, Title LX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,413-23 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter Policy
Interpretation]; Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Policy Interpretation]. The
Department of Health, Education and Welfare originally had administrative oversight responsibility;
with its demise, the responsibility for assessing educational institutions is within the Department of
Education.
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
11. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2002).
12. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(a).
13. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c) and 106.41(a).
14. Parenthetically, during June 2002, the Secretary of Education authorized a commission to
look into the state of affairs at the nation's intercollegiate athletic programs that were recipients of
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Part II reviews some preliminary matters concerning Title IX's application
when sexual harassment is involved. Part III focuses on relationships between
teachers and students, and between coaches and student-athletes, including a
landmark Supreme Court decision and its aftermath. Part IV explores the
administration of athletic departments, governing regulations, and litigation
involving amateur athletics.
II. TITLE IX AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT GENERALLY
Although the statute is silent on explicitly covering sexual harassment
within the definition of "sex discrimination," it is clear that Title IX does
cover sexual harassment conduct. 15 As indicated, in addition to the statute,
there are implementing regulations, although none of the regulations voice
instruction on the specific actions of sexual harassment.
Nationally, sexual harassment in employment has been prohibited through
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 Sexual harassment is broken down
into two general types: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment
harassment. Students' claims for quid pro quo harassment (such as a professor
demanding sex from a student in exchange for a high grade) in an educational
environment are infrequently advanced. 17 In general, Title IX cases alleging
federal funds. The commission issued a report on January 29, 2003. See Secretary's Commission on
Opportunity in Athletics, at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/inits/commissionsboards/athletics/index/html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2003). This was followed by the issuance of a minority report. Donna de Varona
& Julie Foudy, Minority Views on the Report of the Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, Feb.
2003 [hereinafter Minority Report]. The complete text of Minority Report is included within this
publication. The Secretary pledged that he would not entertain any of the recommendations within the
Commission's report unless they had received unanimous endorsement by all fifteen members. See
Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 612-13. It is not expected that any action the Secretary
may take would impact on this issue of prior notice as a condition precedent to a federal lawsuit. The
Commission was charged with looking into extracurricular athletics only on the intercollegiate level,
and not both the intercollegiate and interscholastic area.
15. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994). See Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX's 25th
Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545, 618-50 (1997)
[hereinafter Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym], for a foundation on the area of sexual
harassment. See also Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate
Athletics During 1992-93: Defining the "'Equal Opportunity" Standard, 1994 DETROIT C.L. REV.
953, 1018-21 (1994) [hereinafter Heckman, Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard] (examining
early Title IX sexual harassment cases).
17. "Quid pro quo harassment arises when the receipt of benefits or the maintenance of the status
quo is conditioned on acquiescence to sexual advances." Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d
463, 467 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995)).
See, e.g., Klemencic v. Ohio State Univ., 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1998), discussed infra; Slater
v. Marshall, 906 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1995), discussed infra.
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sexual harassment were sparse 18 until the 1992 Supreme Court decision in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,' 9 which upheld the right to
monetary damages when intentional discrimination is proven, in a case where
a female student alleged sexual harassment against the school board for the
action of a male teacher, who was incidentally a coach of one of the boys'
teams. This decision, coming twenty years after the initial passage of Title IX,
which allowed for monetary damages rather than mere injunctive relief, would
be groundbreaking. Subsequently, allegations of educational institutions
permitting, fostering, or sanctioning a hostile environment for students
continues to be increasingly litigated, especially in light of the Franklin
decision. Since civil litigants are seeking monetary damages, specifically
against educational institutions based on allegations of Title IX violations
concerning sexual harassment, the critical issue is what standard should be
applied. This issue was not addressed in Franklin. It would not be until 1998
that the Supreme Court, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District,20 answered this inquiry as it involves teachers and students.
Additionally, in 1998 the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal involving
what Title IX standard, if any, should be applied to determine the culpability
of educational institutions for peer (student-on-student) sexual harassment,
which resulted in its 1999 decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education.21 The fallout from these two decisions remains to be seen.
A. What Standard Should Be Applied?
Title IX covers an assortment of harassment, from creating a hostile
educational environment verbally to sexual abuse, including statutory rape. In
general, prior to the Franklin decision, individuals utilized the criminal justice
system for the more egregious situations. Title IX presented a potential civil
avenue to pursue remedies. 22 The discourse concerning the parameters of
Title IX's protection and remedies has essentially only begun, despite the
intervening thirty years since the statute's enactment.
During the 1990s, the judiciary applied a number of different approaches
18. See Heckman, Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, supra note 16.
19. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). For a discussion of the Franklin case, see Diane Heckman, Women &
Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 1, 24 n. 102
(1992) [hereinafter Heckman, Women & Athletics]. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
532 U.S. 843 (2001) (concluding front pay was not an element of compensatory damages in a Title
VII employment-based discriminatory action).
20. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
21. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
22. See Diane Heckman, Title IX Tapestry: Threshold & Procedural Issues, 153 EDUC. L. REP.
849, 867 (2001) [hereinafter Heckman, Title IX Tapestry].
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to determine whether an educational institution was liable for the intentional
discriminatory acts of its employees or students pursuant to Title IX.
Some of the approaches are so close as to be overlapping. The first
standard required knowledge or direct involvement by the school district or
educational institution. The second standard used the intentional
discrimination standard from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VI).23 The factors required to satisfy this standard are: (1) a showing of direct
involvement of the school district in the discrimination; or (2) a showing of
(a) actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the district of the sexual
harassment of a student, and (b) that the school failed to take immediate
appropriate action reasonably calculated to prevent or stop the harassment.
A third standard utilized the agency principles contained in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, Section 219(2)(b), essentially a
negligence or reckless standard. The six factors needed to satisfy this "agency
standard" were: (1) the school district is subject to Title IX; (2) plaintiff was
sexually harassed or abused; (3) by an employee of the educational institution;
(4) the educational institution had notice, either actual or constructive, of the
sexual harassment or abuse; (5) the educational institution failed to take
prompt, effective, remedial measures; and (6) the conduct of the educational
institution was negligent. This is basically a modified version of the Title VI
standard, with the addition of the last element.
A fourth standard imposed the Title VII's standard of employer liability in
hostile environment sexual harassment cases, in that the employer knew, or
should have known, of the offending circumstances. The elements required to
satisfy this standard are: (1) that the individual is a member of a protected
group; (2) that this individual was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
(3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the individual's
education and create an abusive educational environment; and (5) that some
basis for institutional liability has been established.
The fifth standard required strict liability. In addition, a final standard was
reliance on negligence liability. The United States Department of Education's
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) oversees administrative compliance with Title
IX. On March 13, 1997, the OCR issued its Final Policy Guidance using a
negligence standard for Title IX hostile environment claims. 24 The Seventh
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994) prohibits discrimination based on race in certain public places,
such as public educational institutions that are recipients of federal funds.
24. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students,
or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039-41 (Mar. 13, 1997). Revisions were subsequently made
to this policy statement in light of the Gebser and Davis decisions. See Verna Williams & Deborah L.
[Vol. 14:1
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Circuit in Smith v. Metropolitan School District Perry Township pronounced,
"While this recently elaborated Policy Guidance may represent the
longstanding view of the OCR, the application of agency principles has no
foundation in the language of Title IX." 25  The Supreme Court would
ultimately put the diverging opinions to rest with its two pivotal decisions.
B. Who Should Be Informed of the Sexual Harassment?
The aspect of actual knowledge or constructive knowledge is another issue
within the paradigm: to whom must the knowledge be transferred or made
available in order to have the educational institution be held ultimately
responsible for the sexual harassment? 26 Should a potential plaintiff have to
establish that notice was communicated: (a) solely to the members of the
school board when dealing with an elementary or secondary school; or (b)
should knowledge to the individual school's administrators (for example the
principal or vice-principal) suffice; or (c) should it suffice for a student,
parent, or guardian to inform a student's teacher, coach, or guidance
counselor? Should the age of the student be taken into effect? If it is a minor,
then should notice to a teacher suffice? If an accident occurred in the
Brake, Sexual Harassment: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, WEEA DIGEST, Oct. 1998, at 3-4, 6
(noting that "Title IX does not ban flirtation." Id. at 4. Moreover, "Title IX does not suppress
academic discourse, even if it is offensive." Id.). For cases dealing with claims of offensive
classroom language, see, e.g., Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 951 (2001); Gallant v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 997 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
25. 128 F.3d 1014, 1033 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998).
26. See, e.g., Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 678
(1999) (J. Kennedy dissenting). For cases issued post-Gebser: see Baynard v. Alexandria City Sch.
Dist., 535 U.S. 594 (2002) (teacher-student sexual harassment: notice to principal was insufficient);
Baynard v. Malone, 268 F. 3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, sub nom. Baynard v. Alexandria City
Sch. Bd., 535 U.S. 954 (2002); Warrant ex rel. Good v. Reading Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 163 (3d Cir.
2002) (teacher-student sexual harassment: notice to principal was sufficient; however, notice to a
guidance counselor was not); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) (peer sexual
harassment: notice to principal was sufficient); Bostic v. Smyrna Sch. Dist, No. 01-0261KAJ, 2003
WL 723262 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2003) (coach-student-athlete sexual harassment: notice to principal was
sufficient); Crandell v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 320-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(teachers-medical student sexual harassment retaliation: notice to associate dean of Clinical Affairs,
who had authority to take corrective measures, was sufficient); Morlock v. W. Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 892 (D. Minn. 1999) (teacher-student sexual harassment). For cases issued pre-Gebser: see
Smith, 128 F.3d 1014; Kracunas v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997); Rosa H. v. San Elizario
Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) (teacher-student harassment, concerning school
official); Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996) (teacher-student
harassment: notice to a homeroom teacher was not sufficient); Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 8
F. Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (teacher-student harassment, granting summary judgment even
though grade school student had complained to another teacher); Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F.
Supp. 2d 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (coach-student-athlete harassment); Miller v. Kentosch, No. 97-
6541, 1998 WL 35520 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 1998) (teacher-student harassment).
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teacher's classroom, every teacher would be obligated to inform his or her
superiors. Should a more burdensome requirement be imposed on students
when the act involves sexual harassment? At the elementary and secondary
level, the students do not have regular unfettered contact with the school
principal or vice principal as compared to a teacher or coach. Moreover,
whether the students know or encounter school board members or the
superintendent of the public school district would be a rare occurrence.
In general, a classroom teacher would be obligated under state law to
report any suspected child abuse of their students.27 If teachers are enveloped
with this serious obligation and responsibility, which is consistent with the
prevailing status of the school acting in loco parentis, then should such notice
to a classroom teacher of sexual harassment activity be sufficient to meet the
requirement for the element of actual notice (with the explicit and implicit
understanding that it is the teachers' obligation to pass on the information to
their superiors-employers)? Likewise, if a school administrator is informed,
then wouldn't that (automatically) be that individual's responsibility to inform
the school board? On the collegiate level, likewise, to whom is notice
required: a professor, coach, athletic director, the school president or provost,
or board members? It remains to be seen which school employees will be
deemed the "appropriate" individuals. 28
C. Leading Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases
The 1997-98 Supreme Court term remarkably yielded three decisions in
the area of Title VII employment sexual harassment. On March 4, 1998, the
27. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 1995) (requiring teachers to report
incidents of suspected child abuse); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(a) (West 1996) (same). See
Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 865 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (female student alleged a
male high school teacher and coach had sexually abused her violating her Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights concerning her liberty interest; and secondarily, that the principal failed
to report the sexual abuse as required by Texas state law), appealfiled, No. 94-41318, 1996 WL
65684 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 1996) (finding that principal was not required to report suspected child abuse
between a female student and male coach, where the principal saw the two individuals together and
where he asked another coach if anything was going on between the two and received an inconclusive
response by the other coach). See also Doe v. Gooden, 214 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
school district officials' failure to report alleged sexual abuse by a teacher, in violation of an Arkansas
state law, did not rise to a section 1983 constitutional violation, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)). But see
P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Mo., 265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001) (determining that a Kansas
public school district could be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to receive and investigate
claims of sexual abuse and failing to train its employees to prevent or terminate sexual abuse).
28. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (imposing the requirement that an appropriate person must be
placed on notice who has authority to make changes). See infra Part Ill, section B for discussion of
the Gebser opinion and Part I1, section D for cases issued post-Gebser.
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Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.29 held that
same-sex harassment claims are actionable pursuant to Title VII. In addition to
heterosexual relationships, Title IX also protects against same-sex 30 and
transsexual 31 educational harassment claims. On June 26, 1998, the Supreme
Court in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,32 found that an employee could
still prevail in a Title VII action against an employer in a sexual harassment
lawsuit where she refused the unwelcome sexual advances of a superior even
though the individual suffered no tangible negative job condition as a result.33
The Court further instructed that the employer could limit or escape liability if
it had "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior. .. -34 Moreover, the Court indicated that the employee
29. 523 U.S. 75 (1998), on remand, 140 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 1998).
30. See, e.g., Warren ex rel. Good v. Reading Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 163 (3rd Cir. 2002) (involving
a male fourth grade student alleging sexual harassment involving his male teacher, who was
subsequently arrested); Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting a
claim of sexual harassment brought by a female student against a female matron charged with
monitoring the girls' bathroom); P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001)
(finding no Title IX liability as the school did not learn of a relationship, which purportedly lasted for
two years, between a male teacher with the male student, until after it ended); Doe v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (involving allegations of sexual harassment of male students
by a male teacher), on remand (granting the school district summary judgment on the Title IX claim),
aff'd, 220 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2000) (principal's response to an allegation of sexual molestation did not
amount to deliberate indifference; thus, the male student did not meet the high standard imposed by
the Supreme Court based on the intervening decision in Gebser, discussed infra), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1073 (2001); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996) (female teacher-
female student alleged harassment); Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 969 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D.
Ala. 1997) (male teacher-male student alleged harassment); Donovan v. Mount Ida Coll., No.
96CV10289RGS, 1997 WL 259522 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 1997) (concerning allegations of Title IX sexual
harassment by female lesbian student against her college for alleged acts of female professor in
making unwanted sexual advances.) The court found that Title IX was not restricted to heterosexual
conduct. Id. at *2.
31. See, e.g., Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd (without mem.),182
F.3d 900 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding Title IX protection covered a male-to-female transsexual in the
process of becoming a female, who was at all times treated as a female, and had alleged sexual
harassment by a male professor).
32. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). See also Lisa 1. Fried, Sexual Harassment: Revisiting the High Court's
Rulings a Year Later, N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1999, at 5 (summarizing that "employers must take steps to
prevent sexual harassment and establish procedures for complaints, and employees with such claims
must avail themselves of these procedures before filing suit"). The article also summarized the results
of sixteen employment sexual harassment decisions issued by the Second Circuit Court since Ellerth
and Faragher).
33. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742. "We must decide, then, whether an employer has vicarious liability
when a supervisor creates a hostile work environment by making explicit threats to alter a
subordinate's terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the threat." Id. at
754. In Russell v. Bd. of Trs., 243 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit Court held boorish
comments can not establish a hostile work environment pursuant to Title VII.
34. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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was obligated to "take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer...."35
On the same day, June 26, 1998, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,36 concerning a female ocean lifeguard
working for the City of Boca Raton in Florida, who claimed inappropriate
bodily touching of her thigh and backside by two male lifeguard superiors.37
The Court stated, "So, in Harris, we explained that in order to be actionable
under the statute, a sexually objectionable environment must be both
objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so." 38 The
Court found that an employer would be liable for workplace hostile
environment sexual harassment that results in a "tangible employment action"
being taken against an employee. 39 The Court also elaborated upon when an
employer may be held liable for non-tangible actions and identified two
affirmative defenses that could be interposed by the employer: where the
employer "exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior" and where the employee "unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer to avoid harm." 40
The Court would not impose these requirements when it came to Title IX
sexual harassment claims involving students subject to sexual harassment. 41
However, reliance on Title VII may still occur in Title IX employment
harassment cases. This is again fostered due to the void in the Title IX statute
and regulations pertaining to sexual harassment.
35. Id. at 745.
36. Id. at 775.
37. Gaylord Shaw, Employers Beware: Rulings Make it Easier to Sue for Sex Harassment,
NEWSDAY, June 27, 1998, at A3. "Even though the city had a formal anti-harassment policy, the
Court found the city liable, noting that Boca Raton had failed to disseminate the policy to the beach
employees. The Court also faulted Boca Raton for making no effort to keep track of the supervisors'
conduct and for not making clear that employees could bypass the harassing supervisors if they
wanted to file complaints." Steven Greenhouse, Companies Set to Get Tougher on Harassment:
Policies Under Review After Court Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1998, at 14.
38. 524 U.S. at 787 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22).
39. Id. at 807-08.
40. Id. at 807.
41. See e.g., Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
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III. TITLE IX AND THE NOTICE REQUIRMENT IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASES
A. Pre-Gebser Decisions Involving Teacher-Student Harassment
There has been an enormous proliferation of Title IX sexual harassment
cases by students based on actions of their teachers.4 2 During 1996-1997, the
Second, 43 Fifth,44 Sixth,45 and Seventh46 Circuits all issued decisions in this
42. See e.g., McCaffrey v. Oona R.-S., 526 U.S. 1154 (1999) (female sixth-grade student alleged
sexual harassment by student-teacher and fellow students); Lankford v. Doe, 513 U.S. 815 (1994)
(Section 1983 action involving a fifteen-year-old female student alleging sexual abuse by male
biology teacher, who was incidentally a coach); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60
(1992), on remand, 969 F.2d 1022 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (female student alleged sexual harassment by
male teacher, who was incidentally a coach); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988);
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, sub nom. Caplinger v. Doe,
506 U.S. 1087 (1993); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (female
high school students alleged sexual harassment against male science teacher-coach of women's soccer
team); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F. 3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996) (allegations of a homosexual
relationship between teacher and student would be actionable under Title IX); Cohen v. San
Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (ruling that the college's sexual harassment
policy was unconstitutionally vague. Herein, a female student in the male professor's remedial
English class charged him with sexual harassment due to the content of his remarks in class, including
a class discussing pornography), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1140 (1997); Stilley v. Univ. of Pittsburgh,
968 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (applying agency principles to a female student's claim of sexual
harassment by a male professor (advisor and supervisor). There existed a genuine issue of material
fact to preclude the granting of summary judgment on behalf of the University); Nelson v. Almont
Cmty. Sch., 931 F. Supp. 1345, 1355 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (applying the Title VI intentional
discrimination standard to a male high school student, who alleged sexual harassment by a female
English teacher); Bolon v. Rolla Pub. Sch., 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (raising allegations by
sixteen-year-old female student against male teacher, who was also incidentally a football coach);
Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1207 (9th
Cir. 1997), opinion withdrawn & superseded on denial of reh 'g, 143 F.3d 473, cert. denied, sub nom.
McCaffrey v. Oona R.S., 526 U.S. 1154 (1999); Slater v. Marshall, 906 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(female college student alleged quid pro quo harassment by male professor at Montgomery County
Community College); Kadiki v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1995) (female
college student alleged sexual harassment by male biology professor); Does v. Covington County
Sch. Bd., 884 F. Supp. 462 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (male students alleged sexual harassment by male
teacher); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (portraying
allegations of sexual molestation of female student by male band teacher); Moire v. Temple Univ.
Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); Alexander v.
Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (concerning female
manager of field hockey team).
43. Kracunas v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997). See Freydel v. N.Y. Hosp., 242 F.3d 365
(2d Cir. 2000) The Second Circuit in analyzing a disability discrimination case, premised on the lack
of a Russian sign language interpreter, brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1994), cited Gebser, discussed infra, and commented, "The premise, in other words, is an official
decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation." Id. at *4.
44. See, e.g., Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101
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area. The Supreme Court would ultimately review this area in 1998. A
number of these cases showcase that merely informing other teachers about
the actions of a particular teacher will not satisfy sufficient notice to trigger
liability upon the school district. This approach does a disservice to students
subject to sexual harassment and provides an enormous insulation for
educational institutions.
1. Elementary and Secondary Students
In Leoia v. Canutillo Independent School District,47 a female student
alleged sexual harassment by a male physical education teacher, who was
incidentally a coach. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's
imposition of strict liability on the school district for the criminal actions of a
male teacher toward a female student.48 The court stated, "Simply put, strict
liability is not part of the Title IX contract. In addition, there is no sound
policy reason to hold a school district financially accountable, through strict
liability, for the criminal acts of its teachers."'49 The court explained, "Strict
liability converts the school district from being the educator of children into
their insurer as well."'50 Instead, the Fifth Circuit required utilization of the
Title VII hostile environment standard, whereby the school district could be
liable if it had actual or constructive knowledge. The homeroom teacher, told
of the alleged abuse, did not possess the requisite authority to satisfy the notice
F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996), reh g denied, (Jan. 8, 1997) (suggestion for rehearing en bane also denied),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1265 (1997); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.
Tex. 1995), rev'd, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
Co., 900 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Tex. 1995), on appeal, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996) (concerning the
issue of coverage by a liability insurance policy issued to the school district charged with teacher-
student sexual harassment).
45. See, e.g., Franks v. Ky. Sch. for the Deaf, 142 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 1998) (reviewing whether
there was Eleventh Amendment immunity, which insulated a private individual from suing a state
entity in federal court); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying agency
principles involved in a Title VII action to a claim brought pursuant to Title IX involving sexual
harassment of a student by a teacher). See also Stilley v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 968 F. Supp. 252 (W.D.
Pa. 1996).
46. Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998).
47. 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd and remanded, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g
& suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (Jan. 8, 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1265 (1997). See also
Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 900 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 99
F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1996). This lawsuit was a companion case, based on the underlying facts involved
in Leya.
48. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
49. Id. at 399.
50. Id. at 400.
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provision imputed to a "management-level" position. 51 The court stated,
"Therefore, before the school district can be held liable under Title IX for a
teacher's hostile environment sexual abuse, someone in a management-level
position must be advised about (put on notice of) that conduct, and that person
must fail to take remedial action." 52 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
1997.53
A fifteen-year-old female high school student brought a Title IX lawsuit in
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent School District5 4 against her school
district for sexual abuse by her after-school karate instructor, a twenty-nine-
year-old male,. The Texas jury awarded the plaintiff $300,000.00 in damages.
The Fifth Circuit again rejected a strict liability standard for a teacher's sexual
abuse of students. Instead, the court applied this standard:
In order to hold a school district liable under Title IX for teacher-
student sexual harassment based on a hostile educational environment,
a plaintiff must show that an employee who has been invested by the
school board with supervisory power over the offending employee
actually knew of the abuse, had the power to end the abuse, and failed
to do so. 5
The court continued, ruling:
We hold that when a teacher sexually abuses a student, the student
cannot recover from the school district under Title IX unless the
school district actually knew that there was a substantial risk that
sexual abuse would occur. In requiring actual knowledge, we reject
the district court's theory that agency law can substitute imputed
discriminatory intent for actual discriminatory intent in Title IX
cases.
56
The court further underscored, "It is important to note that agency principles
would create liability for school districts in virtually every case in which a
teacher harasses, seduces, or sexually abuses a student."57 Furthermore, since
Title IX was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, then it "should not
generate liability unless the recipient of federal funds agreed to assume the
51. Id. at 402.
52. 1d. at 401.
53. Leia, 520 U.S. at 1265.
54. 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).
55. Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 648.
56. Id. at 652-53.
57. Id. at 655.
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liability."58 The court stated, "Whether the school official is a superintendent
or a substitute teacher, the relevant question is whether the official's actual
knowledge of sexual abuse is functionally equivalent to the school district's
actual knowledge." 59
In a matter of first impression, the Seventh Circuit in Smith v.
Metropolitan School District Perry Township60 disregarded utilization of an
agency concept to hold an educational institution liable under Title IX based
on actions of a teacher toward a student. Instead, the Seventh Circuit would
apply liability "[o]nly if a school official who had actual knowledge of abuse
was invested by the school board with a duty to supervise the employee and
the power to take action that end such abuse and failed to do so ...."61
Smith's "reliance on Section 219(2)(d) is misplaced for another reason - it
creates strict liability and strict liability cannot form the basis for a monetary
award in a suit brought pursuant to Spending Clause legislation." 62
The following cases illuminate the issue at the district court level.63 The
lawsuit, Does v. Covington County School Board,64 involved allegations of
sexual harassment involving a male teacher with male students. In
determining what standard should be applied, the Alabama District Court
stated:
The Court finds that actual notice of potential abuse is sufficient to
establish, prima facie, that the Board had notice that the Does were
being harassed. The Court does not believe that an educational
institution should be absolved of liability simply because a parent fails
to wait until he or she has concrete evidence of abuse to report to
school authorities. Sexual abuse and harassment should be detected
and halted at the earliest possible opportunity, preferably before it
58. Id. at 654.
59. Id. at 660.
60. 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997).
61. Id. at 1034.
62. Id. at 1029 (quoting Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660).
63. See e.g., Roe v. New Phila. Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (male
student pleaded allegations of sexual harassment against a female teacher); Buckley v. Archdiocese of
Rockville Centre, 992 F. Supp. 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (female high school student alleged Title IX
sexual harassment by a male teacher, a religious brother, at her parochial high school located within
the archdiocese, but was rebuffed due to lack of Title IX jurisdiction). See Heckman, Title IX
Tapestry, supra note 22 at 855, text accompanying notes 44-45 (discussing the issue of whether the
school had been a recipient of federal funds).
64. 969 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (Does 11). See also Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd.,
930 F. Supp. 554 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (Does 1).
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occurs.
65
The court also postponed ruling on another claim advancing peer hostile
environment until the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education.66
In Seneway v. Canon McMillan School District,67 a female student
asserted allegations of sexual harassment against her eleventh-grade teacher,
who was incidentally the boys' head wrestling coach. The Pennsylvania
District Court stated:
Although in Franklin, the Supreme Court did not directly address the
issue of a school district's liability for the intentional acts of its
teacher, the Court appears to indicate that it would impose liability on
a school district under agency principles for intentional sex
discrimination by its agent, the teacher.68
In Davis v. DeKalb County School District, 69 the Georgia District Court
absolved the school district of any Title IX liability where a prior investigation
of a male physical education teacher led to his exoneration. Here the school
district was unaware of any untoward actions by this teacher toward the
female student-plaintiff. Herein, the two were engaged in playing touch
football, where the teacher was the quarterback and the student was the center.
In Leach v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp.,70 the Indiana District
Court granted the school's motion for summary judgment where a female high
school student and member of the softball and basketball teams alleged a
number of instances of improper physical contact by the male wrestling coach,
who was also the plaintiffs physical education teacher, after the principal had
specifically informed the teacher not to be alone in his office with female
students. 71 The physical education teacher would direct the student to come
into his office, where he would inappropriately grab her breasts or buttocks or
kiss her. He had even brought in mistletoe at one of the plaintiffs basketball
practices and proceeded to hold it up over each girl's head and kiss everyone
on the cheek. 72 The presence of the girls' basketball coach was not disclosed
during this incident. The plaintiff did not inform her mother or school
65. 969 F. Supp. at 1283.
66. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
67. 969 F. Supp. 325 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
68. Id. at 335.
69. 996 F. Supp. 1478 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
70. 2000 WL 33309376 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2000).
71. Id. at *1, 5.
72. Id. at *4-5.
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personnel of the reputed sexual harassment.
The facts indicated that during the contemporaneous period, this teacher
had sexually abused at least two other students and a female special education
teacher. The special education teacher reported that the coach had tried to kiss
her; apparently no action was taken against the coach. This was just before the
first incident that the plaintiff complained of in her litigation.73 As a result of
investigating an incident concerning another female student, who the coach
had told to come into his office and then proceeded to grope, the school
learned about the plaintiff. The school immediately suspended the physical
education teacher, who plead guilty to misconduct. The court concluded that
even if the complaints by the other students and teacher constituted sufficient
notice, the school's actions did not constitute deliberate indifference. 74
2. Post-Secondary Students
The cases profiled herein involve the purported actions of male
professors. 75  The first case involved allegations of inappropriate sexual
comments made by a male English professor at Iona College in New York
toward two female students. The Second Circuit, in Kracunas v. Iona
College,76 noted that the professor "was most certainly acting as Iona's agent
in his role of college professor." 77  It held, "College students should not
receive less protection from conduct that is shown to be harassment (as
opposed to teaching) than do employees in the workplace." 78 The appellate
court advised, "Whether a particular school official is 'at a sufficiently high
level of the hierarchy' depends on the facts of each case." 79  The court
elaborated, "[I]f a professor has a supervisory relationship over a student, and
the professor capitalizes upon that supervisory relationship to further the
harassment of the student, the college is liable for the professor's conduct. '80
A thirty-three-year-old, female, Ph.D. student in psychology at Kent State
University was required to complete an outside practicum as part of her
doctorate program. The student was accepted at a program offered through
Cleveland State University (CSU). She alleged in Petrone v. Cleveland State
73. Id.
74. Id. at * 15.
75. See also Miles v. N.Y. Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
76. Pallett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated and remanded, sub noma.
Kracunas v. lona Coll., 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997).
77. Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 87.
78. Id. at 88.
79. Id. at 90.
80. Id. at 88.
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University81 that her male supervisor at CSU harassed her through
inappropriate comments and placing his hand inappropriately on her leg. The
student had received a favorable determination in the course. At her
completion of the practicum, the program director invited the student to
discuss the program, which she declined to do. She did not advise CSU of any
alleged problem until three months later. The director was investigating
another possible incident with this doctor. The supervising doctor submitted
his resignation. 82 The Ohio district court held that "[t]he Sixth Circuit has
determined that Title VII agency principles apply to sexual harassment cases
brought pursuant to Title IX. ' 83 However, "[t]he record in this case does not
support a quid pro quo harassment claim."84  As to a hostile environment
claim, "[w]here the harasser is the plaintiffs supervisor[,] the plaintiff must
establish employer liability under agency principles." 85 The court held that
the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of Title IX sexual
harassment. The female student's reluctance to discuss the matter proved
detrimental to her claim.86
B. Supreme Court Decision in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District: Silence is Golden
The Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Lago Vista Independent School District,87
imposed no Title IX liability on a school district, where the teacher involved in
the alleged sexual harassment of a student was the only school employee
aware of the situation, and the plaintiff presented no counter-evidence of
notice. The court recognized that although the teacher's status aided in
commission of the alleged misconduct, it was not sufficient to impose liability
on the school district based on common law agency theories. 88 The student
appealed.
On June 22, 1998, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Gebser v.
Lago Vista Independent School District.89 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held
81. 993 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Ohio 1998). See Donovan v. Mount Ida Coll., No.
96CV10289RGS, 1997 WL 259522 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 1997).
82. Id. at 1122-23.
83. 993 F. Supp. at 1128 (citing Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 514 (6th Cir. 1996)).
84. Id. at 1129.
85. Id. (citing Kauffman v. Allied Signal Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 183-84 (6th Cir. 1992)).
86. Id. at 1131.
87. 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524
U.S. 274 (1998).
88. Doe, 106 F.3dat 1226.
89. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274 (1998) (5-4 decision) (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer
20031
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that the school district must have actual notice of the sexual harassment before
Title IX liability would be imposed due to improper teacher-student
interaction.9" The facts demonstrated that a male high school teacher met the
female coed while he was an eighth-grade middle school teacher.91 The two
became involved in a sexual relationship when the plaintiff attended high
school. The student did not inform anyone at the school of the relationship. 92
Some parents complained to the school principal of remarks made by the
teacher in his classroom.93  The principal warned the teacher about
inappropriate comments, but he did not inform the school supervisor of the
larents' complaints. Thereafter, the teacher was arrested for having sex with
the student in a location off the school grounds. The school district did not
have any official grievance procedure for lodging sexual harassment
complaints, nor had it issued a formal anti-harassment policy. 94
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the majority. The Court stated,
"We conclude that damages may not be recovered in those circumstances
unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to
institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has actual notice of, and is
deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct. '95
The Court eschewed the Title VII agency standard because Title VII
"explicitly defines 'employer' to include 'any agent,' § 2000e(b) .... Title IX
contains no comparable reference to an educational institution's 'agents,' and
so does not expressly call for application of agency principles." 96 The Court
distinguished Title VII from Title IX: "Thus, whereas Title VII aims centrally
to compensate victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on 'protecting'
individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal
funds." 97 The Court explained, "Applying those principles here, we conclude
that it would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX to permit a damages recovery
against a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on
dissented). Interestingly, these four Justices, along with Justice O'Connor, would form the majority
axis in Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
90. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292.
91. Id. at 277.
92. Id. at 278.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
96. Id. at 283. See Frederick v. Simpson Coll., 149 F. Supp. 2d 826, 835 (S.D. Iowa 2001)
(commenting that the Supreme Court in Gebser "[r]efused to expand liability under Title IX to
include the concepts of respondeat superior or constructive notice that apply in Title VII cases.").
97. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287. However, originally Title VII had no reference to compensatory
amounts to be afforded aggrieved individuals. Both statutes were enacted to prohibit sex
discrimination, so the alleged distinction seems nebulous.
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principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e., without actual
notice to a school district official." 98  Thus, the Court raised the bar by
requiring actual notice rather than constructive notice. The Court noted, "As a
general matter, it does not appear that Congress contemplated unlimited
recovery in damages against a funding recipient where the recipient is unaware
of discrimination in its programs." 99  The Court highlighted, "Title IX's
express means of enforcement-by administrative agencies-operates on an
assumption of actual notice to officials of the funding recipient."' 0 0
In reviewing the Title IX statutory language, the Court stated:
Because the express remedial scheme under Title IX is predicated
upon notice to an "appropriate person" and an opportunity to rectify
any violation, 20 U.S.C. § 1682, we conclude, in the absence of
further direction from Congress, that the implied damages remedy
should be fashioned along the same lines. An "appropriate person"
under § 1682 is, at a minimum, an official of the recipient entity with
authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination.
Consequently, in cases like this one that do not involve official policy
of the recipient entity, we hold that a damages remedy will not lie
under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to
address the alleged discrimination, and to institute corrective measures
on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the
recipient's programs and fails adequately to respond. We think,
moreover, that the response must amount to deliberate indifference to
discrimination. 101
Section 1682 states in part:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section
may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to
continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as
to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement,
but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular
political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a
finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the
98. Id. at 285.
99. Id. The Court said indicia of this was the restriction that Congress placed on monetary
damages for plaintiffs establishing Title VII causes of action. Id. at 285-86. However, before the ink
was dry on that statement, the Court went on to identify that Title IX was modeled on Title VI. Id. at
286.
100. Id. at 288.
101. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
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particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has
been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided,
however, that no such action shall be taken until the department or
agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the
failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. 
102
Thus, the Court imposed a two-part requirement: first, an appropriate person
must be put on notice, and secondly, the institution must have failed to
adequately address the alleged discrimination. 103 Both components must be
satisfied. The following discussion will address the first part of the equation.
Clearly, there is no statutory or regulatory definition of the words
"appropriate person." Until this 1998 decision, there had been no judicial
exploration interpreting this phrase. Nonetheless, the majority leapfrogged
from the idea of having "actual notice to a school district official," 10 4 to
imposing its daunting definition of the "appropriate person," by creating the
"super appropriate person." While the Court recognized that the statutory
scheme explicitly set forth the administrative enforcement aspect, it identified
no documents from either the Department of Education or its predecessor, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, as to whom the executive
departments deemed were appropriate persons. Interestingly, no exploration
was done as to the agencies' actions. It would appear that many individuals
could come under a natural interpretation of this term. It would seem that
legal counsel for an educational institution would be deemed an appropriate
person for administrative purposes, and yet according to the judicially-
imposed definition, this individual would be ejected. But the argument is not
with whether an attorney would or would not be included -it is with who,
literally, must be placed on notice. Is the Court requiring that the student must
literally inform the super-appropriate person? Or is notice to any other school
employee sufficient, with the understanding that in the in loco parentis
environment, telling a teacher about the actions of the offending school
employee is sufficient?
Moreover, it must be stressed that the OCR, on behalf of the Department
of Education, is not giving pre-notice; it is instead giving administrative due
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
103. The district court in Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 539-40 (M.D.N.C. 2001),
described the standard as a three-prong test, indicating the following must be established: (1) it must
involve an official of the educational institution, who at a minimum has authority to address the
alleged discrimination and institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf; (2) has actual
knowledge of the alleged discrimination; and (3) responds with deliberate indifference.
104. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285.
[Vol. 14:1
IS NOTICE REQUIRED ... ?
process notice that either an administrative complaint has been filed alleging a
Title IX violation or that this educational institution, which is a recipient of
federal funds, has been selected for a compliance review, whereby the OCR
can randomly select any school without having any grounds whatsoever that a
violation or even alleged violation has in fact occurred. This administrative
notice is, according to the administrative scheme of enforcement, not a
condition precedent, which the Gebser case is imposing. Thus, it is submitted
that such notice provided by the administrative agency is procedural, rather
than herein, where the notice provision was turned into a substantive notice
requirement.
Has the Court forgotten the essence of the relationship between the school
and the student, that it is acting in loco parentis, in place of the parent? What
is most disconcerting is that the Court, whi!e still requiring a condition
precedent notice requirement, ignored the reality of the sexual harassment
relationship, by not stating that any educational employee who learns of a
possible sexual harassment incident involving another school employee is
required to inform the administration. It is one thing to eschew application of
a respondeat superior standard, that merely because one employee committed
an act the educational institution should not automatically be held liable.
However, it is another if the court does not deem actual notice by the
"administration" when any school employee, other than the offending
individual, has come to know of possible sexual administration, and that is not
sufficient. All teachers and coaches should be charged with reporting such
information to their supervisors, such as the school principals, who would
likewise be charged with informing their supervisors, the superintendent of the
school boards. Moreover, some of this activity not only would be sexual
harassment, but could also enter the realm of child abuse, a reportable offense,
which teachers are affirmatively charged with reporting through state statutes,
as well as constituting criminal activity.
When the Supreme Court demands that the appropriate person be put on
notice, does it mean literally or is there a respondeat superior aspect imputed
with the actual transference of the knowledge? Thus, if the Court means that a
school can be insulated -because the first grade student only informed another
coach or teacher of the offending actions of another school employee, rather
than directly telling the school superintendent- this is an unconscionable
position. Is the Court's intention to construct a code of silence, whereby
fellow teachers and coaches would not have to simply report the information
to their superiors? Even herein, assuming that this student had informed the
principal that a teacher was having sexual relations with her, she would still be
required to satisfy the second aspect. Again, it is the contours of the first
2003]
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component that is truly problematic. Not surprisingly, a dissent was filed.10 5
C. Supreme Court Decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
There have also been a prodigious amount of decisions issued involving
peer sexual harassment. 10 6 During May 1999, the Supreme Court issued its
opinion concerning a claim of Title IX sexual harassment based on allegations
of peer sexual harassment as the underpinning against the public school
district. Therein, the fifth-grade female complained of offensive actions by a
male fifth-grade student. She had informed her teachers about the offensive
actions. One of the purported incidents occurred during a physical education
class, where the plaintiff informed the physical education teacher. In Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education, 107 the Supreme Court stated:
[F]unding recipients are properly held liable in damages only where
they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they
have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school. 108
The Court did not elaborate on the identity of the specific individuals within
the educational institution that need to be apprised of the potential harassment.
The dissent observed, "The majority's enunciation of the standard begs the
obvious question: known to whom? Yet the majority says not one word about
the type of school employee who must know about the harassment before it is
actionable. The majority's silence is telling." 10 9
105. Justice Stevens wrote, "The rule that the Court has crafted creates the opposite incentive.
As long as school boards can insulate themselves from knowledge about this sort of conduct, they can
claim immunity from damages liability." Gebser, 524 U.S. at 300-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. See Diane Heckman, Tracing the History of Peer Sexual Harassment in Title IX Cases
(forthcoming Aug. 2003) (manuscript at 19, on file with the Marquette Sports Law Review)
(exploring the Davis decision in greater detail, as well as reviewing post-Davis cases rendered).
107. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
108. Id. at 650. The Court instructed, "Likewise, we declined the invitation to impose liability
under what amounted to a negligence standard -holding the district liable for its failure to react to
teacher-student harassment of which it knew or should have known. Rather, we concluded that the
district could be liable for damages only where the district itself intentionally acted in clear violation
of Title LX by remaining deliberately indifferent to acts of teacher-student harassment of which it had
actual knowledge." Id. at 642.
109. Id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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D. Post-Gebser Decisions
In the post-Gebser era, courts are beginning to require the following to
establish a prima facie case: (1) the individual plaintiff was subject to either
quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual harassment in an educational
program or activity that is a recipient of federal funds; (2) an educational
institution official with the authority to take corrective measures had actual
knowledge or notice of the sexual harassment; and (3) despite such
knowledge, the educational institution official was deliberately indifferent to
the sexual harassment and failed to reasonably respond.I10  Other issues are
emerging, including: what individual is the appropriate individual to be put on
notice; what constitutes appropriate notice; and what will constitute deliberate
indifference?' I
The cases cover all levels of education.' 12 On the collegiate level, the first
two cases dealt merely with language, while the others pertained to allegations
110. See e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1999); Morse v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir. 1998); Frederick v. Simpson Coll., 149
F. Supp. 2d 826, 835 (S.D. Iowa 2001); Gordon v. Ottumwa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1077,
1081 (S.D. Iowa 2000).
111. See e.g., Waters v. Metro. State Univ., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Minn. 2000) (investigation
done after female filed a sexual harassment complaint concerning consensual sexual relations with a
professor; while the court commented the investigation could have been a tad more thorough, it did
not constitute deliberate indifference), aff'd, 2002 WL 31398959 (8th Cir. Oct. 17, 2002)
(unpublished decision). See also Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir.
2000) (concerning what constitutes a reasonable response); Gordon v. Ottumwa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 115
F. Supp. 2d 1077 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (concerning the adequacy of the school's response); Niles v.
Nelson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 13 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that the deliberate indifference standard did not
equate with a negligence standard under New York state law); Morlock v. W. Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 892 (D. Minn. 1999) (discussing the issue of whether the response was made in a prompt
and timely manner).
112. See e.g., Shrum v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2001) (concerning letter of
recommendation made by one school, which another school relied upon in hiring a teacher. A male
student at school district B alleged Title IX sexual harassment and a Section 1983 action based on the
actions of a male teacher, who was recently employed by school district B. In the first case of its type
under Title IX jurisprudence, the student sued both his school district (school district B), as well as
the former school district (school district A). School district A had provided a favorable letter of
recommendation as part of a confidential settlement whereby this teacher charged with numerous acts
of possible sexual harassment agreed to leave the school. The Eighth Circuit reported that school
district A was not liable for the sexual abuse allegedly perpetrated by the teacher toward the student at
school district B.). See also Becerra v. Asher, 921 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding no
liability on the school district in this Section 1983 action with allegations of sexual abuse by male
music teacher of male eleven-year-old student schooled at home, where the plaintiff alleged the
school adopted a policy of transferring pedophiles. Id. at 1544. The teacher plead guilty to child
molestation and was sentenced to fifty years in prison.), aff'd, No. 9620401, 1997 WL 35402 (5th Cir.
Feb. 14, 1997); Anonymous v. Lyman Ward Military Acad., No. 2950915, 1997 WL 112730 (Ala.
Civ. App. Mar. 14, 1997) (finding military academy was not liable for sexual molestation committed
by an employee, where a background check was made of the employee).
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of offensive actions by professors: all the cases involved activity of male
professors toward female students. In Gallant v. Board of Trustees of
Cali fornia State University, 113 a California district court found no Title IX
violation based on allegations of a male professor's use of sexually graphic
language in conversation with a Native American, lesbian, graduate student. 114
On June 23, 1999 (Title IX's anniversary date), the Second Circuit, in Miles v.
New York University,1 15 found that a male professor did sexually harass a
male-to-female transsexual, but the university was not liable under Title IX. 1
16
In Burtner v. Hiram College, 17 a female college student alleged quid pro
quo sexual harassment and hostile environment regarding unwanted sexual
verbal utterances and touching by a male professor. 118 The plaintiff had
entered into a consensual sexual relationship with this professor. Prior to
graduation, another female student had filed a complaint with the result that
the professor was found to have sexually assaulted this second coed. 119
However, the Ohio District Court found no liability by the college toward this
plaintiff as the college did not learn of the incident until shortly before
graduation, which constituted insufficient time to rectify the situation. 120
There remained a question of fact as to whether a post-secondary
institution exhibited deliberate indifference in Chontos v. Rhea,12 1 involving a
female student's allegations of sexual harassment by a male associate
professor at Indiana University. The female student alleged being forcibly
kissed and fondled during a private conference in the professor's office.
Herein, the state university was aware of numerous incidents concerning this
113. 997 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998). See Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (1 1th Cir. 1999)
(concerning whether a school district superintendent should be individually liable for a Title IX
sexual harassment suit commenced by a female high school student based on allegations of sexual
abuse by one of her teachers).
114. Id.
115. 182 F.3d 900 (2d Cir. 1999).
116. Id.
117. 9 F. Supp. 2d 852 (N.D. Ohio 1998). See also Kraft v. Yeshiva Univ., 2001 WL 1191003
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2001), concerning a male doctoral student's claim of retaliation based on failure to
accept his initial dissertation and then a refusal to grant him an extension for a new dissertation topic
where after he had defended his initial doctoral proposal he had allegedly ended a consensual sexual
relationship with the female director of the doctoral program for the School of Social Work.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 29 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Ind. 1998). But see Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I.
1999) (concluding that even though other professors knew of a relationship between a male professor
and female college student, this did not impute Title IX liability in this sexual harassment lawsuit
where the student alleged rape, as the professors had no reason to know the relationship was not other
than a consensual relationship).
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professor that allegedly spanned a five-year period and it had originally
reprimanded the professor and required this employee to attend counseling
after the first reported incident. The university argued that prior alleged
incidents were made by female students who elected not to pursue their
complaints formally. 122 This Indiana court denied the university's motion for
summary judgment. 123
The following cases discuss incidents at elementary and secondary
schools.' 24 Two female fourth-grade students alleged sexual harassment by
the male fifth-grade teacher due to his touching of the girls' breasts in Doe v.
Beaumont Independent School District.125 The girls indicated that the teacher
draped his hand around both girls' shoulders on individual occasions and then
moved his hand down lower. 126 One of the girls had complained to one of her
teachers about the fifth-grade teacher but did not identify the alleged
harassment. 127 One day while a substitute teacher was teaching, another girl
came into the classroom crying, allegedly due to actions by the fifth-grade
teacher.128 The substitute teacher then asked the students to write down if
they had had any incidents with this teacher. 129 The two plaintiffs wrote down
their accounts with the fifth-grade teacher. 130 Immediately, the principal
suspended the teacher, while criminal charges were pending against him. The
teacher then submitted his resignation. 131 This Texas federal court noted that
122. Id. at 935-36.
123. Id. at 939.
124. Other decisions were also rendered. On June 26, 1998, the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 951 (1998). See
Doe v. Howe Military Sch., 227 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 2000) (determining this Title IX lawsuit
predicated upon sexual harassment against faculty did not comply with the applicable statute of
limitations); P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kan. City, 265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding no liability where a
male student did not inform the school of a sexual relationship with a male teacher that purportedly
lasted two years); Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000) (male middle
school student originally claimed a Title IX violation against his school district due to allegations of
excessive corporal punishment ordered by his male physical education teacher; however, the
proponents later removed the Title IX claim); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (1 1th Cir. 1999)
(female high school student alleged Title IX sex discrimination against her school district due to her
alleged sexual molestation by a male teacher. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the district
superintendent was not subject to individual liability under Title IX. This is also in keeping with the
normal stance that Title IX is directed toward the educational institution. See Heckman, Title IX
Tapestry, supra note 22, at 866).
125. 8 F. Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
126. Id. at 602.
127. Id. at 603.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Doe, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
131. Id.
20031
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"[t]here is some evidence that prior sexual abuse accusations were leveled
against [the fifth-grade teacher] in August of 1993."132 In reviewing the
caselaw, the court found, "In the Fifth Circuit, there appears to be two possible
theories under which a school district may be found liable in a Title IX action:
actual notice or constructive notice." 133 However, in this case, the court found
neither, stating, "In this case, Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that [the
principal], the supervisory employee, should have known of the alleged sexual
abuse." 134  Therefore, the court granted summary judgment as to all
defendants on the Title IX cause of action. 135
The decision is rather remarkable. The plaintiffs were unsuccessful even
as the school district purportedly took appropriate action after being informed,
in that herein, the alleged perpetrator was immediately suspended upon his
arrest. Obviously, the due process rights of all teachers and educational
employees must be protected, especially where students could falsely accuse
individuals of sexual harassment. However, herein, it is not clear if the court
was insulating the school district because the principal was not directly told by
the fifth-grade students or because the substitute teacher did not specifically
inform the principal of what transpired that school day. To judicially condone
the situation herein seems counter to the intent of Title IX.
In discussing the notice requirement, the Fourth Circuit in Baynard v.
Malone,136 informed, "To the extent there is any doubt about the nature of the
actual notice requirement articulated in Gebser, it is removed by the
subsequent opinion of the Court in Davis."' 37 This appellate court thus
concluded that adequate notice was not satisfied as concerned a public school
principal involving allegations of sexual harassment by a teacher toward a
student. The court found, "Although [the principal] certainly should have
been aware of the potential for such abuse, and for this reason was properly
held liable under § 1983, there is no evidence in the record to support that [the
principal] was in fact aware that a student was being abused."' 138 However, in
a fascinating aside, the Fourth Circuit imputed a broad tangent of the notice
requirement, stating:
[A] Title IX plaintiff is not required to demonstrate actual knowledge
132. Id. at 609.
133. Id. at 614.
134. Id. at 615.
135. Doe, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 616.
136. 268 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, sub nom. Baynard v. Alexandria City Sch. Dist.,
535 U.S. 954 (2002).
137. 268 F.3d at 238.
138. Id.
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that a particular student was being abused. We believe that the actual
notice requirement could have been satisfied, for example, if [the
principal] had [sic] actual knowledge that [the teacher] was currently
abusing one of his students, even without indication of which student
was being abused. 13
9
The court also imparted its agreement with the Fifth Circuit as to "whether a
supervisory employee may be viewed as the proxy of the school district
depends upon whether the district has delegated to that employee the
traditional powers of an employer, e.g., the authority to hire and terminate
employees."' 140 The court concluded that the principal did not statutorily have
this power, which was reserved pursuant to state law to the school district,
even though the court recognized that the principal could submit
recommendations about a teacher's continued employment.141
While the Fourth Circuit would countenance notice of sexual harassment,
even if it did not involve the specific plaintiff, the Southern District of New
York in Crandell v. New York College of Osteopathic Medicine,142 informed
that Title IX does not require that the subject individual must inform the
educational institution of each incident of alleged sexual harassment. This
court underscored:
Clearly, the institution must have actual knowledge of at least some
incidents of harassment in order for liability to attach, as this is the
thrust of Gebser. It is equally evident, however, that actual
knowledge of every incident could not possibly be required, as this
would burden the plaintiff unfairly in cases of frequent harassment to
report many separate incidents to the appropriate authorities and
would oblige the court to determine whether each incident alleged was
reported and therefore is actionable .... This minimum standard is
appropriate because it adopts Gebser's focus on institutional
culpability while not putting an unrealistically heavy burden on Title
IX plaintiffs. 143
E. Claims Involving Coaches and Student-Athletes
With the increase in individuals participating in sports, the element of
sexual harassment in athletics is a repugnant aspect, being brought to light
139. Id. at n.9.
140. Id. at 239 (citing Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 660).
141. Id.
142. 87 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
143. Id. at 320.
2003]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
within the past decade. 144 Dr. Joel Fish, director of the Center for Sport
Psychology in Philadelphia, stated, "There's more opportunity for female
athletes than ever before, but the flip side is that there's [greater] risk to those
athletes because we haven't developed policies, legislation, and screening
[procedures] to keep up with the social progress made by Title IX.' 145 An
author and former female student-athlete opined, "In fact, sexual harassment
and abuse of female athletes are part of the reality of women's sports."'146 A
2001 Houston Chronicle three-month investigation identified sixty-four Texas
high school or middle school coaches who had lost their jobs due to
allegations of sexual misconduct since 1996, with nineteen coaches entering
into agreements with the State of Texas to surrender or have their teaching
certificates revoked. 147  The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), with its myriad rules and regulations, has no sexual harassment
policy that would prevent any sexual relationship between coaches and
intercollegiate athletes.
On the intercollegiate level: On May 14, 1998, two female varsity tennis
players commenced the lawsuit, Ericson v. Syracuse University,148 seeking
$25 million in damages based on allegations of sexual harassment by their
male tennis coach in violation of Title IX and another federal statute, the 1994
Violence Against Women Act. 149 A New York federal court had previously
144. See R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (for an
examination of the first Title IX lawsuit based on allegations of sexual harassment of a female athlete
by her male coach). See Heckman, Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, supra note 16, at
1019-20 (discussing the R.L.R. case). See also Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note
16, at 624-26 (for a discussion of other earlier decisions involving actions by coaches toward student-
athletes).
145. Robin Finn, Growth in Women's Sports Stirs Harassment Issue: [Special Report], N.Y.
TIMES, March 7, 1999, at 1, 24. Generally, these matters concern allegations brought by females
against male coaches; however, female coaches are not exempt from implication in this category.
Additionally, males have also been subject to sexual harassment by male coaches.
146. Leslie Heywood, Despite the Positive Rhetoric About Women's Sports, Female Athletes
Face a Culture of Sexual Harassment, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1999, at B4. See also Leslie
Heywood, Female Harassment is Still Widespread in Sport, N.Y. TIMES, § 8, Nov. 8, 1998, at 11
(referring to her new book, PRETTY GOOD FOR A GIRL). See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the
Gym, supra note 16, at 624-26 (detailing coach-student-athletes sexual harassment cases).
147. See Associated Press, Sexual Misconduct by Coaches in Texas: 64 Cases, NEWSDAY, Apr.
22, 2001; Editorial, "'Out of Bounds; " Abuse in Schools Must Be Recognized as Problem, HOUSTON
CHRON., Apr. 29, 2001, at 2.
148. 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (trial was scheduled to begin during March 1999).
"After a university panel recommended a two-year ban of [the tennis coach] in 1997, finding that he
had violated sexual harassment and discrimination policies, the punishment was reduced to a three-
month suspension." Robin Finn, Harassment Becomes Concern as Women's Sports Keep Growing,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, at 1.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 13981. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (concluding this
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ruled that an intracorporate conspiracy doctrine prevented the coeds from
pursuing a claim that the university's counsel and a student member of the
hearing panel had acted improperly. 150 However, the court found that based
on the evidence presented, the university had actual notice of harassment of
female athletes for an extended period, but took no steps to remedy the
situation, which constituted sufficient grounds to make out a prima face case
for purposes of the new standard the Supreme Court imposed in the Gebser
case. 15 1 The district court recognized:
The mere failure of an institution to promulgate a grievance procedure
for dealing with discrimination does not necessarily imply its
knowledge of any given instance of discrimination. By contrast, the
purposeful failure of an official with actual knowledge of an
employee's discrimination and the authority to remedy the misconduct
to adequately respond is tantamount to 'an official decision by the
[institution] not to remedy the violation.'1 52
On the eve of trial, the parties settled the case for an undisclosed amount. 
15 3
On August 25, 1998, two female former NCAA Division I collegiate
soccer players instituted a $12 million dollar lawsuit, Jennings v. University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill1 54 based on allegations against their very
successful, male, soccer coach. The coach denied the charges. In what
appears to be a first in a Title IX case involving athletics, the female plaintiffs
also alleged that certain assistant soccer coaches, also named as defendants,
were aware of the alleged sexual harassing incidents. 5 5 Initially, the venue of
federal statute was unconstitutional in violation of the Commerce Clause).
150. Ericson,35 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
151. Id. at 328. The trial court upheld the plaintiffs' claim that the cause of action alleging a
transgression against the Violence Against Women Act was constitutional. Ericson v. Syracuse
Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 344, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (commenting, "Functionally, moreover, the
Brzonkala court's view of the Commerce Clause considerably limits the ability of Congress to
address the complex interaction of social and economic forces typical of the modem state." Id. at
347).
152. Ericson, 35 F. Supp 2d at 328.
153. See Deborah Pines, Federal Domestic Violence Law is Endorsed in Southern District,
N.Y.L.J., April 14, 1999, at 6.
154. No. 98C5261, 1999 WL 301669 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1999). See S.L. Price, Anson Dorrance,
The Legendary North Carolina Women's Soccer Coach, Is Sure He Understands What Makes A
Female Athlete Tick, And He Has 15 National Titles To Prove It. So Why Are Two Former Tar Heels
Suing Him For Sexual Harassment?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 7, 1998, at 86. Dorrance is deemed
the most successful NCAA women's soccer coach. Grant Wahl et al., Passion Plays, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 10, 2001, at 58.
155. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 240 F. Supp. 2d 492, 502 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
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the court was changed. 156 Four years after the initiation of the lawsuit, a
North Carolina district court issued a decision as to the defendants' motions to
dismiss the complaint based on individual causes of action alleged, as well as
collectively. 15
7
In Klemencic v. Ohio State University,158 a female former student-athlete
alleged Title IX quid pro quo sexual harassment when she refused the
romantic advances of her former male collegiate track coach, whereupon the
coach allegedly withdrew his offer for the plaintiff to train with his team and
serve as an assistant coach. The graduate had informed the male athletic
director of the coach's alleged actions. The coach admitted to the athletic
director that he had asked the woman for a date. 159 The plaintiff argued that
the university's actions amounted to attempted indifference. 160 On July 14,
1998, in a post-Gebser decision, the Ohio federal district court found the
plaintiff did not meet the Gebser standard and, therefore, held the university
was not liable for any Title IX violation. 161
On the interscholastic level, in Bostic v. Smyrna School District,162 a male
track coach allegedly began a sexual relationship with one of his female
student-athletes, when she was fifteen-years-old. The relationship continued
for over a year, with the coach admitting to having sex with this athlete on
school property. The coach's wife had complained to the principal about the
close relationship. The football coach had heard of rumors concerning the
two, and saw the two standing so extremely close that he thought they were a
student-couple. This coach reported the information to the assistant principal.
There was apparently no follow-up by the school. Another teacher had
informed the assistant principal of what she had heard. She was told the
matter was being taken care of. The court concluded that the principal was an
appropriate official to place on notice. 163 The court noted that even though the
principal may not have known of the actual sexual affair between the coach
156. Jennings, 1999 WL 301669, at *1 (N.D. I1. April 30, 1999) (agreeing to move the venue to
a North Carolina district court, presumably where the university was located).
157. SeeJennings, at *l.
158. 10 F. Supp. 2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1998). See Wahl et al., supra note 154, at 64-65 (describing
this matter and indicating that the University had reportedly offered the runner $370,000.00 to settle
the matter, which was declined).
159. Klemencic, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
160. Id. at 918.
161. Id. at920-21.
162. No. 01-0261KAJ, 2003 WL 723262 (D. Del. Feb. 24, 2003) (the coach allegedly involved
was subsequently arrested for having an illicit relationship with another student and was then arrested
for his relationship with the plaintiff. He ultimately plead guilty concerning his conduct with the
plaintiff).
163. Id. at *4.
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and student, nonetheless:
[A] rational fact finder could indeed conclude that [the principal] did
have, or certainly should have had, 'actual knowledge' of
inappropriate conduct amounting to harassment of a student by a
member of the school's staff, whether or not he knew that they had
consummated their relationship with sexual intercourse. An
administrator cannon turn a blind eye to a mounting stream of
information showing that a staff member and student are engaged in
an obviously inappropriate relationship. The evidence in this case can
fairly be characterized as going well beyond a demonstration of the
mere risk of harassing behavior. 164
The Arizona district court in Jane Doe One v. Garcia165 denied the school
district's and vice principal/athletic director's motion for summary judgment
in a case brought by a female high school student based on allegations of
sexual harassment by this male administrator. 166
164. Id.
165. 5 F. Supp. 2d 767 (D. Ariz. 1998).
166. For other cases concerning allegations of sexual harassment involving coaches or athletes:
see Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), en banc decision,
vacating earlier circuit decision, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999),
sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (female student, who was a member of the
women's softball team, alleged Title IX sexual assault by male football players); Canty v. Old
Rochester Reg'l Sch. Dist., 54 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Mass. 1999) (female high school student sought
compensatory and punitive damages against the school district based on her alleged rape by a male
coach on school property), 66 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D. Mass. 1999) (denying the school district's motion
for summary judgment attributable to the compensatory damages claim, but granting the motion as to
the dismissing of the punitive damages action claim); Burnell v. Williams, 997 F. Supp. 886 (N.D.
Ohio 1998) (Section 1983 action involving sexual contact between a male coach and female student);
Divergilio v. Skiba, 919 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (finding no section 1983 standing for the
parents based on allegations regarding male gym teacher who exposed himself to a male student. 42
U.S.C. § 1983); Kuhn v. Youlten, 692 N.E.2d 226 (Ohio App. 1997) (state appellate court affinned
the lower court's granting of summary judgment to the city board of education, which owned a public
ice skating rink, the city recreation department and the private skating club in this case brought by a
female ice skating student who alleged a male ice skating instructor had sexually molested her);
Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (female student alleged tortuous
conduct against the principal and school board based on alleged sexual action by the plaintiffs female
coach and physical education teacher); Sormani v. Orange County Cmty. Coll., 659 N.Y.S.2d 507
(App. Div. 1997) (female clerical worker alleged sexual harassment by a male basketball coach);
Bratton v. Calkins, 870 P.2d 981 (Wash. App. 1994) (finding a purported sexual relationship between
a teacher/coach and student was not within the scope of the teacher's employment). See also, supra
note 42 (wherein a number of the teachers charged with sexual harassment were incidentally also
athletic coaches).
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F. Individual Employees and Whether They Are Appropriate Individuals to
Place on Notice
The issue of who is an appropriate individual employee to place on notice
of the alleged sexual harassment is beginning to be fleshed out.
In Murrell v. Schoo! District No. 1,167 a case involving peer sexual
harassment commenced by a developmentally and physically-disabled female
student against another special education male student, the Tenth Circuit
stated, "It is possible that these teachers would also meet the definition of
'appropriate persons' for the purposes of Title IX liability if they exercised
control over the harasser and the context in which the harassment
occurred."1 68
A number of district courts have voiced opinions. Cases dealing with the
elementary or secondary level are presented first. In Miller v. Kentosh, 169 the
school did not learn of the improper sexual relationship between a male
teacher and the female high school student until the teacher was arrested after
authorities found the couple engaging in sexual relations in a car. The teacher
was immediately fired due to this incident. The student alleged that other
teachers knew of the relationship. The court found that the teachers could not
be considered "officials with authority to take corrective action." 170 Thus, the
Pennsylvania District Court, after applying the Gebser standard, found no
Title IX liability regarding the school. In Morlock v. West Central Education
District,17 1 a female student informing the assistant principal that a male
teacher had told her that she was the "sexiest boy" he had ever seen and that
the teacher engaged in inappropriate conduct with her was sufficient notice.
On the collegiate level, the following opinions were issued. In Liu v.
Striuli,172 the director of the financial aid department was not deemed an
appropriate person, nor was the director of the graduate history department, as
the harassment occurred within the department of modem languages. In
Litman v. George Mason University,173 the court stated, "Gebser did not
167. 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
168. Id. at 1248.
169. No. 97-6541, 1998 WL 355520 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 1998). See generally Fort Wayne Educ.
Ass'n v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 753 N.E.2d 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling male teacher did not
sexually harass female student by showing her his nipple ring and adjusting his underwear in front of
her).
170. Miller, 1998 WL 355520 at *7.
171. 46 F. Supp. 2d 892 (D. Minn. 1999).
172. 36 F. Supp. 2d452 (D.R.I. 1999).
173. 131 F. Supp. 2d795 (E.D. Va. 2001).
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discuss who might be an official with such authority."' 174 This court found
that notice to another professor of sexual harassment activity did not constitute
an appropriate person. In Frederick v. Simpson College,175 the court found
that the notice to the chair of the department where the offending professor
taught or notice to the assistant dean of that department would be deemed
appropriate individuals -presumably because both could discipline this
professor. 176
IV. TITLE IX SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATIONAL ATHLETIC
PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES
It is uncontroverted that the responsibilities and duties of educational
employees, whether teachers, coaches, administrators, or others, do not
include engaging in sexual harassing behavior. Whether these employees have
a legal duty, as opposed to an ethical one, 177 to place their superiors on notice
of the purported sexual harassment activities remains unresolved. This goes to
situations where the teacher or coach is directly informed by a student of
allegations of sexual harassment by another school employee or where the
teacher views or comes in contact with activity clearly going beyond the
normal bounds of teacher-student interaction, such as another teacher kissing a
student on the lips in the hallway after school, or seeing a coach and student-
athlete walking hand-in-hand in a park on a weekend. In New York, state law
provides that certain designated educational employees, such as teachers, who
have reasonable cause to believe elementary and secondary students under the
age of twenty-one are alcohol or substance abusers or substance dependent,
who report such suspicions, "shall have immunity from any civil liability that
might otherwise be incurred or imposed as a result of the making of such a
report."'178 Clearly, the Title IX statute could also be revised to provide such
174. Id. at 798.
175. 149 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Iowa 2001).
176. Id. at 837.
177. See generally CAROL ALBERTS, COACHING ISSUES AND DILEMMAS: CHARACTER
BUILDING THROUGH SPORT PARTICIPATION (2003) (examining ethical issues in amateur athletics).
178. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3028-a (McKinney 2003). The law does not specifically designate
coaches for this protection. Id. Whether this statute is constitutional remains to be seen in terms of
its Big Brother-like aspect of now having teachers also be the monitors for drug usage or alcohol
usage by the public school students of the state. Have all parental functions been co-opted by the
educational institution? However, the provision is interesting as it is cognizant of the litigious
climate. At this juncture, the Supreme Court in Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995),
has sanctioned drug testing of student-athletes attending public schools and in Bd. of Educ. v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822 (2002) upheld drug testing of public school students involved in "competitive"
extracurricular activities. See Diane Heckman, The Evolution of Drug Testing of Interscholastic
Athletes, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 209 (2002).
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protection.
While Title IX prohibits sexual harassment within the definition of sexual
discrimination, the Supreme Court has imposed a tough standard in order for
the potential student to advance a claim of Title IX sexual harassment against
the educational institution for monetary damages for such egregious activity.
The Court has imposed a notice requirement that in order for a claim to go
forward, the potential plaintiff must have first put the appropriate individual
on notice that such unsanctioned action or actions have occurred, so that the
educational institution may take corrective actions immediately to end such
untoward actions. The statute and regulations were devoid of any explicit
language as to the issue of sexual harassment. Obviously, claims of sexual
harassment within the athletic department would be governed by the Supreme
Court decisions in Gebser and Davis.
The next inquiry is whether a notice provision should also be imposed on
claims of Title IX sex discrimination in athletic programs or activities when
not involved with sexual harassment.
A. The Nature of the Administration of Athletic Programs
While Title IX pertains to the provision of physical education classes, 1
79
there has been no caselaw in the intervening thirty-one years as to the
conducting of these classes. 180 However, there has been a significant number
of cases advanced during this time as to extracurricular athletic programs
provided. 181 The factors within the administration of the interscholastic and
intercollegiate athletic programs are known commodities, unlike the actions of
teachers and coaches engaged in improper sexual activities, which routinely
are committed in private. While secrecy may shroud improper sexual
behavior, 182 this is not the case for the administration of athletic programs.
179. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 559-60.
180. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 559.
181. See generally, Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five Year
History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletics, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
391, 398 n.34, 420 n.142 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Scoreboard]; Heckman, Sex Discrimination
in the Gym, supra note 16, at 564-92.
182. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278 (describing that the sexual relationship between the male
teacher and female student often occurred during class time, although never on school property). If a
medical student was reluctant to notify administrators of alleged harassment, it can be extrapolated
that the reluctance of a girl or young woman is even more pronounced. See Crandell v. N.Y. Coll. of
Osteopathetic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concerning a female medical student, who
alleged sexual harassment by a number of her teachers). After one particular incident of a physician
allegedly rubbing his genital area against the adult woman, the court noted, "After this incident,
plaintiff felt humiliated, violated and fearful that there could be a negative effect on her medical
career, given the cardiologist's prominence at [the medical school] and in the broader medical
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While the date when imposition of sexual harassment would be within the
Title IX penumbras could be argued, it was clear that Title IX covered
extracurricular athletic programs since the enactment of the regulations in
1975.183 Unlike with sexual harassment, which is never condoned, the
directors of athletic departments would or should be aware of the parameters
and nature of the extracurricular athletic activities, including: the number of
athletic participants broken down by sex; the number of sports offered; the
budgets for the programs; the conditions and locations of the athletic contests;
the equipment and supplies provided; the number of coaches, assistant
coaches, trainers, and other staff; as well as the other myriad components.
Additionally, on the collegiate level, the issuance of athletic scholarships is a
known commodity. There is another federal statute that may be applicable,
demanding the identity of salient aspects concerning the administration of
intercollegiate athletic programs. 184  Moreover, intercollegiate athletic
programs must be in compliance with rules governing athletic associations,
which may have provisions directed toward gender equity. Likewise, the
administration and the respective governing boards should be aware of the
extracurricular athletic programs provided, due to budgetary aspects involved
and hiring decisions.
Athletics is one of the few areas within the entire educational paradigm
where single-sex activities may be provided. 185 All boards and athletic
directors are or should be aware if separate extracurricular athletic programs
are provided for males and females. They should also be aware of the history
of their programs in terms of the expansion or constriction of the sports teams.
community. In consequence, she did not report this experience to anyone at [the medical school]." Id.
at 308; Leach v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch., 2000 WL 33309376 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2000) (A
female high school student and member of the softball team alleged sexual harassment committed by
the male wrestling coach, who was also her physical education teacher. She indicated that after the
teacher reportedly grabbed her breasts in his office, "she did not tell anyone what had happened
because she was ashamed." Id. at *2. After another incident, when the teacher called her into his
office during her physical education class and again grabbed her breasts and buttocks and kissed her,
the student commented, "[s]he didn't tell anyone because she was afraid it might upset her mother
and she didn't think anyone would believe her." Id. During both incidents, the plaintiff had
attempted to stop the physical contact and voiced her lack of consent by telling him no and that she
did not want anything to do with this type of relationship. According to the testimony, this did not
dissuade the coach.).
183. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425 (D.
Kan. 1978), rev'd, 622 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1980) (representing the first legal challenge to the Title
IX regulations).
184. See Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (2000), discussed within.
185. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)(2002). In traditional educational curriculums, certain vocal musical
programs may also provide single sex programs. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(f). See also Section 901(9), 20
U.S.C. § 1681(9) (exempting pageants from having to be coed).
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Therefore, the question arises: Is notice affirmatively required for these
types of Title IX cases; or if so, is the notice already implied when dealing
with the traditional claims of sex discrimination involving athletics?
Claims of Title IX sex discrimination in extracurricular athletics generally
fall into three main areas. 186 The first area is known as "cross-over" cases. It
pertains to the inability by a student of one sex to participate on the team
composed solely of members of the other sex as the potential student-athlete
wants to cross-over onto a team provided. At the very least, the head coach of
every team would know of this incident, as it is routine that a coach is
empowered to determine the composition of the final team, when it is based on
tryouts.18 7 Thus, when only one team is offered, for example, an all-boys
soccer team, and no soccer team is offered for females, it would be known by
the coach of the boy's team that a female tried out for the team and was not
placed on the team. The athletic director, if not informed by his coach that a
member of the opposite sex tried out, would nevertheless know that the school
was not offering a soccer team for females.
The second area concerns the failure to supply "equal opportunity." This
may involve the failure to upgrade club teams to varsity teams, the elimination
of established varsity teams, or the failure to supply equal benefits in the
provision of separate athletic programs for males and females. Again, the
decision of a school to eliminate established varsity teams is known by the
entire administration. The third area concerns the proper distribution of
athletic scholarships to avoid trespassing against Title IX.
B. The Existence of Title IX Regulations Governing Athletic Programs and the
Absence of Express Notice Requirements Within Those Regulations
It must be remembered that while the statute is also silent on mentioning
athletics, there are two specific Title IX regulations pertaining to
extracurricular athletic programs or activities. 188  None of the Title IX
regulations governing athletics require an explicit notice requirement.
Moreover, these regulations required congressional approval.' 89 It should also
be underscored that there have been no changes to any of the Title IX
regulations since their inception in 1975.
Before discussion of the athletics-related regulations, it must be
186. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, which is broken down into three main areas.
187. See e.g., Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525 (M.D.N.C. 2001). See Heckman,
Scoreboard, supra note 181, at 398 n.34.
188. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37(c), 106.41 (2002).
189. See Heckman, Women & Athletics, supra note 19, at 12-13.
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remembered that one regulation requires each recipient of federal funds to
execute a compliance agreement with the federal government, 190 indicating
that the educational institution is in compliance with Title IX (by not
discriminating on the basis of sex in the educational programs and activities),
in return for which the educational institution would receive federal funds. It
states:
Every application for Federal financial assistance [for any education
program or activity] shall as a condition of its approval contain or be
accompanied by an assurance from the applicant or recipient,
satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary, that [each] program or activity
operated by the applicant or recipient and to which this part applies
will be operated in compliance with this part. 191
Even the Supreme Court in Gebser recognized that the interaction between the
federal government and educational institution amounted "essentially to a
contract."
192
Then the regulations go on to identify specific items within the athletic
department that must be complied with. It could be argued that these
regulations place the school on notice as to the conduct of athletic programs
and activities -as part of the contractual obligations. Thus, while introspection
was needed to determine the standard for imposition of liability for sexual
harassment cases, creating the phantom super-appropriate person, such would
not be required for traditional athletics cases. Additionally, the regulations
mandated that all recipients of federal funds were required to conduct a self-
evaluation of their programs within one year of the effective date of the
regulations. 193
The first regulation is entitled "Athletics."' 194 The first subpart tracks the
190. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4. The refusal to execute this agreement was the basis for the lawsuit in
Grove City Coil. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
191. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4.
192. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 ("The two statutes [Title VI and Title IX] operate in the same
manner, conditioning an offer of federal funding on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in
what amounts essentially to a contract between the Government and the recipient of funds." Id.).
Even the dissent, comprising of four Justices, stated, "Moreover, because respondent assumed the
statutory duty set out in Title IX as part of its consideration for the recipient of federal funds, that duty
constitutes an affirmative undertaking that is more significant than a mere promise to obey the law."
Id. at 297.
193. 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(c) (albeit the educational institution was only required to maintain such
information on file for three years following the completion of the evaluation. 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(d)).
There has been no caselaw on this issue. Query, whether this regulation could be presently enforced
where a school never did the initial self-evaluation?
194. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41.
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essential language in the statute. 195 It states:
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from
another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by
a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately
on such basis. 196
The second subpart directs:
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph
(a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams
for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However,
where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for
members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for
members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of
that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex
must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport
involved is a contact sport. For purposes of this part, contact sports
include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and
other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily
contact. 197
This part was notable for the institution of "cross-over" cases, whereby
individuals of one gender wanted to participate on teams composed of
members of the opposite gender.' 98
The next subpart mandates:
(c) Equal Opportunity. A recipient that operates or sponsors
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall
provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In
determining whether equal opportunities are available the Director
will consider, among other factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
195. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a). See Heckman, Scoreboard, supra note 181, at 397-400.
196. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a).
197. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
198. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 563-66.
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(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; [and]
(10) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or
sponsors separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this
section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide
necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of
opportunity for members of each sex. 199
Moreover, the fourth subpart identified the time when the schools should
be in compliance with the law, which directed that elementary schools had one
year from the date the regulations were enacted in 1975, while secondary and
post-secondary schools had three years to comply. 200 Clearly, the time to
comply has expired.
Another Title IX regulation provides:
(c) Athletic Scholarships.
(1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or
grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards
for members of each sex in proportion to the number of students of
each sex participating in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics. (2)
Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of each sex
may be provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of
each sex to the extent consistent with this paragraph and § 106.41.201
On July 23, 1998, the OCR issued the following Guidance Letter
concerning the distribution of athletic scholarships, stating:
If any unexplained disparity in the scholarship budget for athletes of
either gender is 1% or less for the entire budget for athletic
scholarships, there will be a strong presumption that such a disparity is
reasonable and based on legitimate nondiscriminatory factors.
Conversely, there will be a strong presumption that an unexplained
disparity of more than 1% is in violation of the 'substantially
199. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
200. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d).
201. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
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proportionate' requirement. 20 2
There has been minimal caselaw addressing this component. 20 3
There is also the detailed 1979 HEW Policy Interpretation pertaining to
athletic programs and activities, 204 which includes the three-part "effective
accommodation" test 20 5 used to determine compliance with the first program
area of the "equal opportunity" subsection found in the Title IX regulations;
the 1996 OCR Policy Clarification; and 1998 OCR Guidance Letter. More
recently, on July 11, 2003, the OCR Assistant Secretary Gerald Reynolds
issued the letter, "Further Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy
Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance," reaffirming its commitment to
utilization of the three-part effective accommodation test. It stated, "Each of
the three prongs is thus a valid, alternative way for schools to comply with
Title IX... and no one prong is favored. '20 6 It further stated, "Second, OCR
hereby clarifies that nothing in Title IX requires the cutting or reduction of
teams in order to demonstrate compliance with Title IX, and that the
elimination of teams is a disfavored practice." 20 7  There is a noticeable
absence of any explicit notice requirement in these documents. Is the notice
implied due to the conduct in administering these programs?
C. Other Disclosure Provisions
Would the following disclosure requirements also be sufficient to place
universities and colleges on notice of the conduct of their programs?
1. Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act
There is another federal statute, the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act,20 8
202. Letter from Dr. Mary Francis O'Shea, National Title IX Coordinator (July 23, 1998)
(accompanying a letter from Hon. Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary, OCR, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (July
23, 1998)) [hereinafter OCR Guidance Letter].
203. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 587-88.
204. Policy Interpretation, supra note 9. It should be noted that the Policy Interpretation is also
designed to cover "club, intramural, and interscholastic athletic programs .... 44 Fed. Reg. at
71,413 at III.
205. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,417.
206. Letter from the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Further Clarification
of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance 2 (July 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Clarification Letter]. The complete text of Clarification Letter is included within this
publication.
207. Id.
208. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g) (2000) (requiring the submission of the required data on an annual
basis since 1996). For the implementing regulations, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.41, 668.47 (2002)
(Student Assistance General Provisions; Report on Athletic Program Participation Rates and
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which imposes an annual mandatory disclosure of certain information by
colleges and universities that have separate athletic programs for men and
women. The statute requires disclosure by colleges and universities of the
following: (1) athletic participation opportunities;209 (2) certain fiscal
information concerning athletic departments, 210 including the money spent on
athletic scholarships; 211 (3) graduation rates of student-athletes, which is also
broken down by race and gender, but not the individual identity of those
involved;212 and (4) the gender of head and assistant coaches. 213 Disclosure is
not presently required by primary or secondary educational institutions (K- 12).
The implementing regulation requires that each post-secondary
educational institution subject to the statute must issue a report containing the
following information: (1) the number of male and female full-time
undergraduate students that attended the institution;214 (2) a listing of the
varsity teams that competed in intercollegiate athletic competition; and for
each team, the following data: (i) the total number of participants, by team, as
of the day of the first scheduled contest of the reporting year for the team; and
(ii) the total operating expenses attributable to those teams.215 There exists no
caselaw referencing situations: (1) where the college had complied with this
law; (2) where there were discrepancies between the actual figures versus
reported figures; or (3) where the failure to comply with this statute could be
indicia for any notice requirement.
2. NCAA Certification Requirements
Additionally, the NCAA imposes myriad rules and regulations governing
the conduct of such programs. The NCAA requires that Division I member
colleges and universities must be certified. A component of the certification
process is an explicit requirement concerning the issue of gender equity within
that school's program.216 Obviously, the school is required to prepare and
Financial Support Data).
209. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g)(1)(A)-(B).
210. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g)(1) (B)-(I).
211. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g)(1)(D).
212. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e).
213. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(g)(1)(B) (iii)-(iv).
214. The Title IX Commission on Opportunity in Athletics was listening to proposals to exclude
individuals attending college who were over a certain age. See The Secretary of Education's
Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, "Open to All, " Title IX at Thirty (Feb. 28, 2003). The
complete text of this report is included within this publication.
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e). See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 16, at 652.
216. See e.g., NCAA, 1996-97 Division I Athletics Certification Handbook; Heckman,
Scoreboard, supra note 181, at 407 n.75.
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report on this aspect. The caselaw is also devoid of whether information
formulated for such certification would be instrumental. 217
D. Administrative Redress for Athletic Complaints
Within the Title IX paradigm, an individual may pursue three avenues for
redress. First, an individual can access the internal grievance process that
every educational institution that is a recipient of federal funds is required to
have.218 The educational institutions are also required to designate a Title IX
compliance officer. 219  Second, the individual can file an administrative
complaint with the OCR within the Department of Education. 220  An
individual who files such an administrative complaint need not have
standing, 221 and the identity of the complainant can be confidential. 222 When
an administrative complaint is filed, the educational institution is placed on
notice that a complaint has been filed.223 The OCR may also unilaterally
select any educational institution that is a recipient of federal funds and
investigate whether the athletics program is in compliance with Title IX, 224
although the OCR historically has not chosen a significant number of schools
for these compliance reviews. 225 Unlike a lawsuit, a settlement is brokered
217. Parenthetically, in one case the NCAA had found the gender equity aspect was met where
there was an ongoing Title IX lawsuit. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 16, at 580-84 (presenting the earlier
litigation history of the case); Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 118-19 (relaying the
current litigation history).
218. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) ("A recipient shall adopt and publish grievance procedures providing
for prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which
would be prohibited by this part.").
219. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a).
220. See DIANE HECKMAN, WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION REPORT ON TITLE IX, ATHLETICS
AND THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS: AN EXAMINATION OF LETTERS OF FINDINGS ISSUED BY THE
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE POST-RESTORATION ACT ERA (1997), at 209-22 [hereinafter
WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION REPORT] (examining letters of findings issued in regard to both
administrative complaints filed and compliance reviews conducted by the OCR).
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1.
224. Id. at 25 (referring to the Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418).
225. Only seventy-nine compliance reviews were initiated against universities and colleges by
ten regional offices for the period of March 22, 1988 to December 1, 1997, which averages to
approximately eight per regional office over an approximate nine-year period. See Diane Heckman,
Title IX Activity Involving Collegiate Athletic Programs in the Post-Civil Rights Restoration Act Era
(Feb. 1, 2003) at 29-31 (on file with author) [hereinafter Heckman, Title IX Activity] (based on
information supplied by the OCR, dated December 29, 1997, for the period March 3, 1988 to
December 1, 1997, pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request on file with the
Women's Sports Foundation and Marquette Sports Law Review. See WOMEN'S SPORTS
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between the OCR and the educational institution, without the complainant's
acquiescence to the settlement, called a compliance action plan. The
complainant would not be able to obtain monetary damages through the OCR
for any violations, nor would immediate injunctive relief be an option if the
administrative route is pursued. Additionally, there is a lack of consistency by
different OCR regional offices in reviewing similar violations alleged. 226
Notably, the Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual specifically
instructed on the scope of investigations involving interscholastic or
intercollegiate athletic programs, not confining the investigation necessarily to
the specific program area raised by the complainant, who files an
administrative complaint. The equal opportunity subsection of the regulations
enumerates ten specific program areas, although as indicated, the listing is not
finite, as the OCR describes thirteen program components. As to the former, it
informed:
In examining interscholastic athletic programs, the investigation "may
be limited to those program components in which a complaint has
made allegations ...... However, "[i]f during the investigation there
is evidence to suggest that a disparity in a program component being
investigated is the result of an apparent disparity in another program
component that is not being investigated, then that program [area]
should be investigated. 227
Secondarily, the manual signaled:
The OCR use[s] an overall approach and review[s] the total athletics
program for intercollegiate athletics investigations. This means that
if OCR receives a narrowly drawn complaint for intercollegiate
athletics, OCR will investigate all 13 program components ... An
investigation may be limited to less than all 13 of these major
areas... where major circumstances justify limiting a particular
investigation to one or two of these major areas. 228
Thus, the filing of an administrative complaint was the ticket to broad
investigatory powers regardless of whether the complainant had initially put
the recipient of federal funds "on notice" of a problem in a specific program
area of the extracurricular athletics program.
FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 220, at 203 n.62.).
226. See WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 220, at 182-92 (ch. 22: Summary
of Findings).
227. Id. at 206 n.99 (referring to the U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, Title IX
Athletics Investigator's Manual (1990), at 8).
228. Id. at 207 n.120 (referring to the U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, Title IX
Athletics Investigator's Manual (1990), at 7).
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It is not known if the OCR is requiring notice as a condition precedent to
its post-Gebser investigations. The OCR can select any educational institution
that receives federal funds. In any of those cases, the lack of affirmative
notice of any potential violations would be absent by the very nature of the
inquiry. Finally, an individual can commence a lawsuit against the offending
educational institution, with the imposition of stare decisis and formalized due
process.
E. The Gebser Directive
As the Court highlighted in Davis, "The high standard imposed in Gebser
sought to eliminate any 'risk that the recipient would be liable in damages not
for its own official decision but instead for its employees' independent
actions." 229  Therein, Justice O'Connor underscored the contractual nature,
stating, "When Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, it generates
legislation 'much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions."' 230 Moreover, it
must be remembered that the Supreme Court in Gebser restricted imposition
of the notice requirement. It is not required when the discrimination "[does]
not involve official policy of the recipient."'231 Is this language sufficient to
insulate the traditional athletics discrimination program from a notice
requirement, as presumably the conduct of the athletics department involves
an official policy of the recipient of federal funds?
During 2002, in an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a
lower court decision in Morris v. Wallace Community College-Selma,232
where the district court refused to apply the Supreme Court-imposed, hostile
environment criteria in a Title VII action to a claim of general sex
discrimination in failing to promote a white female to the position of athletic
director at the college on two separate occasions where a white male and black
male were hired. A Title IX claim and Equal Pay Act claim were also asserted
in this lawsuit. Does this case serve as a general basis to distinguish the sexual
harassment case from ones not involving sexual harassment?
229. 526 U.S. at 643 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91) (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 640 (quoting Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
231. 524 U.S. at 290.
232. 125 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1328 (S.D. Ala. 2001), affd, 2002 WL 518045 (11th Cir. Mar. 19,
2002). The district court stated, "Absent cogent argument from the defendants, the Court cannot
conclude that the affirmative defense articulated in Faragher and Ellerth applies outside the
harassment context." Id. (citing Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)). See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 556, n.24.
[Vol. 14:1
IS NOTICE REQUIRED...?
F. Caselaw
1. Grandson v. University of Minnesota
The first imposition of a notice requirement in a traditional athletics case
in a federal circuit court decision, appeared in Grandson v. University of
Minnesota.23 3 A female student-athlete, who was a member of the women's
soccer team, alleged Title IX discrimination for a number of reasons, including
"discriminatory funding" of the women's intercollegiate athletics program and
the failure to provide her with an athletic scholarship. 234 A companion case,
Thompson v. University of Minnesota at Duluth,235 was also commenced by
three other female students against the state university for failure to provide
equivalent athletic opportunities for female students, where separate athletic
programs were provided for male and female student-athletes, and to provide
an additional NCAA Division I women's team. The school offered seven
varsity teams for men and seven varsity teams for women; all of the teams
were classified as Division II with the exception of the men's hockey varsity
team, which was a Division I team.236
OCR activity: Prior to the initiation of the lawsuit, an administrative
complaint was filed with the OCR concerning the separate athletic programs
provided for the male and female students. 237 On April 2, 1997, a compliance
action plan was negotiated between the OCR and the University.238 As part of
the settlement, the University agreed to provide a Division I, women's ice
hockey team. The University had already provided a Division I, men's ice
hockey team.
District Court's determinations: Originally, the Minnesota District Court
denied the university's motion to dismiss both actions. Then, the trial court
judge ruled that the plaintiffs in Grandson and Thompson did not have
standing to sue.239 The plaintiffs in both these cases filed appeals, which were
233. No. 97-265 PAM/JGL (D. Minn. March 16, 1998) (unpublished) (Magnuson, J.), aff'd, 272
F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001) (mandating such notice in the opinion dated November 20, 2001). See
Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 574-76 (providing a detailed overview of the court
action).
234. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 572.
235. No. 97-CIV1072 DSD/JMM (D. Minn. March 16, 1998) (unpublished) (Magnuson, J.),
appealfiled, No. 99-1817 (appeal consolidated with the Grandson appeal). See Heckman, The Glass
Sneaker, supra note 1, at 574-76 (providing a detailed overview of the court action).
236. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 572.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 571.
239. Id. at 571 (referring to the unpublished district court decision. "The court ruled that the four
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consolidated.240 After initiation of the lawsuit, as part of the compliance
action plan, the university formed a women's ice hockey team, which proved
quite successful, winning the first NCAA women's ice hockey championship,
held in 2001, offered in the school's division. Obviously, the female students
had the requisite interest and ability.241
Eighth Circuit's opinion: Finally, on November 20, 2001, the Eighth
Circuit reviewed the main issues advanced in the two cases. The court agreed
that the named plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue the lawsuit. 242 The
plaintiffs sought to amend the Title IX lawsuit as a class action alleging
unequal treatment of female student-athletes; the appellate court upheld the
district court's decision, dismissing claims based on failure to timely serve a
request for class certification. 243 The court ruled that the plaintiffs' request in
the Thompson case was satisfied as the university now provided a women's
varsity hockey team. 244 One plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to
request monetary damages for failure to award her a soccer scholarship. The
appellate court again affirmed that the lower court's denial of request to
amend damages was proper "where the amended complaint made no
allegation of prior notice of their complaints to appropriate university officials,
no allegation of deliberate indifference by such officials, and no allegation that
the student athletes afforded the university a reasonable opportunity to rectify
the alleged violations. '" 245
In light of the Gebser requirements, the students argued that actual notice
of the Title IX discrimination came from students, women's groups, and the
plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they had not played a varsity sport or had
exhausted their NCAA eligibility." Id. at 573).
240. Grandson, 272 F.3d 568.
241. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1).
242. 272 F.3d at 574 (indicating that three of the named plaintiffs had exhausted their NCAA
eligibility and one had never played on a varsity team). If the plaintiffs did not have standing, then
should the rest of the decision be deemed dicta? Considering that there was an approximately five
year interim between the initiation of the lawsuit and the issuance of the appellate court's decision,
this is not surprising). The litigants had placed the case on hold, while awaiting the Eighth Circuit's
decision in another case. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 575 n.108. See Cook v.
Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993) (whereby the merits of the case were not examined due to
the graduation or exhaustion of NCAA eligibility by the named defendants). See also Heckman,
Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, supra note 16, at 967-71. The issue of elevating the
women's club team to a varsity team was resurrected in the class action lawsuit, Bryant v. Colgate
Univ., 996 F. Supp. 170 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), which resulted in the formation of a women's varsity ice
hockey team at the University, where a men's ice hockey team had been in existence for a long time.
See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 16, at 579.
243. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 574.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 575.
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university's own employees. 246 Not only did this appellate court impose the
Gebser standard,24 7 rendered in 1998, but it narrowly circumscribed the notice
requirement.
The Eighth Circuit stated, "When an individual plaintiff such as Grandson
claims money damages from a specific Title LX violation, such as failing to
award her a soccer scholarship, Gebser requires prior notice to a university
official with authority to address the complaint and a response demonstrating
deliberate indifference to the alleged violation." 248  This appellate court
specifically rejected certain actions as satisfying the notice requirement. The
court found that the prior filing of an administrative complaint with the OCR
was satisfactory. 249
The court placed great deference on the fact that a compliance action plan
had already been negotiated herein, and the OCR had found the university to
be in compliance with the terms of the plan.250 The Eighth Circuit stated,
"There have been a number of reported Title IX cases challenging women's
collegiate athletic programs, but to our knowledge this is the first case in
which (i) a class action was brought after the relevant federal funding agency
lodged a broad overlapping complaint against the university . ,,251 It is not
uncommon for administrative complaints filed against colleges and
universities to have the entire athletic program examined, taking into account
the ten program areas listed in the "equal opportunity" subpart of the Title IX
regulations.25 2 There were two administrative complaints filed against the
University of Minnesota at Duluth.2 53 The first complaint in Grandson was
246. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 575 n.108 (referring to Appellants'
Reply Brief & Supplemental Addendum (June 28, 1999), at 3-4).
247. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 571. The court stated, "[w]e agree with the district court that the
individual plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief, and that their damage claims do not satisfy
the rigorous standards of Gebser .. " Id.
248. Id. at 576.
249. Id. at 575.
250. Id. at 572.
251. Id. at 573. It was a private complainant who instituted the administrative complaint process;
the OCR did not initiate a compliance review herein.
252. See WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 220, at 207 n. 120. Additionally,
the aspects of support services and the recruitment of student-athletes is also regularly examined
when post-secondary schools are investigated. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,417
(detailing information about these two elements).
253. See Univ. of Minn., Duluth, No. 5-96-2125 (Apr. 3, 1997) (administrative complaint filed
with OCR Region V), in Women's Sports Found., Freedom of Information Act Request (Dec. 29,
1993) [hereinafter WSF FOIA Request] (unpublished manuscript on file with the Marquette Sports
Law Review) and Univ. of Minn., Duluth, No. 5-97-2086 (May 8, 1997) (AC), in WSF FOLA
Request, supra. There was another administrative complaint filed against the University of
Minnesota. See Univ. of Minn., No. 5-94-2233 (Feb. 14, 1996) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request, supra.
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filed on February 3, 1997.254 However, it should be noted that it is not
,ncommon for individuals to file lawsuits contemporaneously or even after
resolution by the executive agency. While all of the following may not fit the
aforementioned criteria, and the examples do not purport to be all-inclusive;
nevertheless, the following showcase that use of both the administrative route
and litigation route were not mutually exclusive:
First, litigation was commenced at the following schools where
compliance reviews (CR) were initiated or administrative complaints (AC)
were filed: Alabama State University; 255 Auburn University;256 California
State University, at Fresno; 257 California State University, at Fullerton; 258
California State University, at Northridge; 259 California State University, at
Sacramento; 260 City University of New York, Brooklyn College;261 Colorado
See Heckman, Title 1X Activity, supra note 225, at 33. The Eighth Circuit decision indicated that the
university was placed on notice of the filing of an administrative complaint during September 1996.
Grandson, 272 F.3d at 572.
254. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 572.
255. Ala. State Univ., No. 4-93-2167 (July 29, 1995) (AC), in Title IX Athletics Investigations 4
(Oct. 31, 1995) [hereinafter OCR Data] (unpublished data, on file with the Marquette Sports Law
Review); Ala. State Univ., No. 4-96-2140 (Aug. 19, 1996) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request, supra note
253; Ala. State Univ., No 4-97-2009 (Jan. 24, 1997) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request, supra note 253;
Beasley v. Ala. State Univ., 966 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (concerning the issuance of an
athletic scholarship). See also Beasley, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Beasley, 3 F. Supp. 2d
1325 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
256. Auburn Univ., No. 4-89-6004 (July 20, 1989) (CR), in OCR Data, supra note 255, at 1;
Kiechel v. Auburn Univ., No. CV-93-V-474-E (M.D. Ala. 1993) (seeking elevation of club soccer to
a varsity team for the female students; case settled during June 1993). See Heckman, Defining the
"Equal Opportunity" Standard, supra note 16, at 990 (lawsuit commenced on April 14, 1993. Id.).
257. Cal. State Univ., at Fresno, No. 9-92-6006 (filed Apr. 20, 1992) (CR), in OCR Data, supra
note 255, at 2, Cal. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Bd. of Trs., No. 949207 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993)
[hereinafter Cal. NOW]. See Heckman, Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard supra note 16,
at 993 (reviewing the case and settlement).
258. Cal. State Univ., at Fullerton No. 9-92-6007 (Aug. 7, 1992) (CR), in OCR Data, supra note
255, at 2; Cal. State Univ., at Fullerton, No. 9-94-2053 (Feb. 2, 1994) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request,
supra note 253; Cal. NOW, No. 949207; Howlett v. Gordon, No. 701610 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992);
Huffman v. Gordon, No. 701610 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992) (concerning the termination of the women's
volleyball coach at the University). See Heckman, Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard,
supra note 16, at 993 (reviewing the California NOW case and settlement), 992 (reviewing the
Howlett case).
259. Cal. State Univ, at Northridge, No. 9-93-2087 (June 2, 1993) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request,
supra note 253.
260. Cal. State Univ., at Sacramento, No 9-91-2039 (Mar. 23, 1991) (AC), in WSF FOIA
Request, supra note 253.
261. City Univ. of N.Y./Brooklyn Coll., No. 2-91-2013 (Feb. 14, 1992) (AC), in OCR Data,
supra note 255, at 2; Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (female
seeking employment-based relief). The district court noted there was testimony concerning the
alleged failure of the OCR to obtain full compliance with the compliance action plan. Id. at 335. See
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State University;2 62 Duke University; 2 63 Illinois State University; 264 Indiana
University at Pennsylvania; 265 San Jose State University; 266 St. Lawrence
University; 267  Syracuse University; 268  Tarleton State University;26
9
University of Arkansas; 270 and the University of Bridgeport.
2 7 1
Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 588 n. 166.
262. Colo. State Univ., No. 8-92-6001 (filed Aug. 4, 1992) (CR), in OCR Data, supra note 255,
at 1; Colo. State Univ., No. 8-97-2089 (filed Jun. 4, 1997) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request, supra note
253. Additionally, on June 2, 1997, the National Women's Law Center (NWLC), long active in
ensuring the rights of females in this area, filed Title IX administrative complaints against twenty-five
of the nations' universities and colleges alleging violation in the distribution of athletic scholarships
to female student-athletes including Colorado State University, wherein the OCR and the University
agreed to increase women's scholarships herein. See Heckman, Title IX Activity, supra note 225, at
34-35. This was after the completion of the litigation in Roberts v. Colo. State Bd ofAgriculture, 998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (retention of the women's varsity softball team), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1004 (1993). See Heckman, Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, supra note 16, at 983-89.
Litigation commenced on June 29, 1992. Id. at 983.
263. Duke Univ., No. 1-97-2045 (filed June 4, 1997) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request, supra note
253, (NWLC also filed an administrative complaint against Duke University, whereby increases for
women's scholarships were to be made); Mercer v. Duke Univ., 32 F. Supp. 2d 836 (M.D.N.C.
1998), rev'd & remanded, 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999), on remand 181 F. Supp. 2d 525 (M.D.N.C.
2001), vacated in part, 50 Fed. Appx. 643 (4th Cir. 2002) (athletic participation by female student on
"coed" football team). See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 564-66. See infra Section
IV(F)(2).
264. Ill. State Univ., No. 5-95-2189 (Mar. 21, 1996) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request, supra note
253; Harper v. Bd. of Regents, No. 95-1371 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1995) (complaint filed) (brought by
both male and female students), on appeal, sub noma. Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 635 (7th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (2000).
265. Ind. Univ. at Pa., No. 3-93-2001 (filed Oct. 8, 1992) (AC), in OCR Data, supra note 255, at
3; Favia v. Ind. Univ. at Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993). See
Heckman, Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, supra note 16, at 972-75.
266. San Jose State Univ., No. 9-93-6007 (filed Apr. 27, 1992) (CR) in OCR Data, supra note
255, at 2; Cal. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Evans, No. 728548 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Anna County 1993)
(complaint filed in 1993). See Heckman, Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, supra note 16,
at 993 (reviewing the case and settlement).
267. St. Lawrence Univ., No. 2-96-2011 (Jan. 31, 1996) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request, supra
note 253; Cooper v. Peterson, 626 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (male student-athletes
contested the elimination of the men's varsity team).
268. Syracuse Univ., No. 2-97-2084 (July 9, 1997) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request, supra note 253;
Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., No. 95-CV-620RSP (N.D.N.Y. May 8, 1995) (commencement of class
action by female students). See Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 1997 WL 328444 (N.D.N.Y. June 12,
1996), on appeal, 164 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1999). See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra
note 16, at 584-85.
269. Tarleton State Univ., No. 6-95-2001 (June 1, 1994) (AC), in OCR Data, supra note 255, at
6; Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997). See Diane Heckman, Lowrey v.
Texas A&M University System: Title IX vis-6-vis Title VII Sex Discrimination in Educational
Institutions, 124 EDUC. L. RPTR. 753 (1998).
270. Univ. of Arkansas, Pine Bluff, No. 6-89-2050 (Sept. 1, 1989) (AC), in WSF FOIA Request,
supra note 253; Caruso v. Broyles, No. 93-5089 (W.D. Ark. 1993). See Heckman, Defining the
"Equal Opportunity" Standard, supra note 16, at 994.
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Second, the student's complaint to the director of the University of
Minnesota at Duluth's (UMD) Office of Equal Opportunity,27 2 was after she
had quit the women's varsity soccer team.
Third, nor was UMD's alleged "[c]onsistently unequal expenditures for its
men's and women's athletic teams ... sufficient evidence of the deliberate
indifference required by Gebser."273  Notably, the court did not mention
whether the school was in compliance with 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c), requiring
"substantial proportionality" between the percentage of scholarships issued
compared to the percentage of student-athletes of that same sex, which would
by necessity have to take into account the financial outlay for the scholarships
awarded. 274 The Policy Interpretation stated, "This section does not require a
proportionate number of scholarships for men and women or individual
scholarships of equal dollar value. It does mean that the total amount of
scholarship aid made available to men and women must be substantially
proportionate to their participation rates." 275
Finally, numerous complaints the University had received "about the level
of funding for women's athletics and the lack of women's varsity teams in
sports such as swimming, ice hockey, and cross-country skiing." 276 The court
was dismissive of this material, commenting, "A vigorous public debate on
these issues does not demonstrate that UMD knew of systemic non-
compliance." 277  Parenthetically, there was no mention of whether the
University had complied with the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act or NCAA
certification. It must be underscored that this court made no comment of the
Gebser verbiage as to whether it did or did not involve the official policy of
the recipient. 278  The appellate court also disregarded UMD's alleged
"disproportionately low athletic scholarships awarded to women" as evidence
of deliberate indifference.279  The plaintiffs in Grandson unsuccessfully
271. Univ. of Bridgeport, No. 1-94-2075 (Nov. 4, 1994) (AC), in OCR Data, supra note 255, at
2; Ulett v. Univ. of Bridgeport, No. 3:94CV01460 (PCD) (D. Conn. Aug. 1994) (class-action
commenced, concerning the university's elimination of the women's gymnastics team; consent decree
entered into during July 1995). See Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 16, at 584
(discussing case).
272. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 576.
273. Id. at 576. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
274. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,414 ("[t]he governing principle in this area is
that all such assistance should be available on a substantially proportional basis to the number of male
and female participants in the institution's athletic program."); Clarification Letter, supra note 206.
275. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,415 (VII.A.3).
276. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 575.
277. Id.
278. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 ("that do not involve official policy of the recipient").
279. Grandson, 272 F.3d at 576.
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sought final appellate review by the Supreme Court.2 81
2. Mercer v. Duke University
The next case received national attention. It involved the issue of athletic
participation. Heather Sue Mercer played high school soccer at Yorktown
Heights High School in Westchester County, New York, where she also was a
kicker for the boys' football team. 28 1 She then went on to Duke University.
The NCAA Division I university had a football team, which was deemed a
coed sport, although no females had ever made the team. Despite the
longevity since Title IX's enactment in 1972, there had yet to be a female on a
NCAA Division I men's or "coed" football team, and there were no football
teams offered exclusively for females regardless of the NCAA division.
During Mercer's freshman year, 1994-95, she had a try-out for the football
team, before both the head coach and kicking coach. 282 The coach was
dressed in a suit and tie.283 Both coaches would testify that conditions were
not ideal, and as a result Mercer did not do well. She did not make the team
for that season.2 84 That spring, she kicked the winning field goal during an
annual spring football contest, where she was the first kicker selected by team
members. 285 After this, the head coach informed Mercer and others that she
had made the team.2 86 This resulted in Mercer receiving calls to be on certain
network late night shows, which she accepted. 287 The university was aware of
the publicity. 288
Apparently, after this, the coach was concerned that "Mercer's presence
on the team might have an adverse effect on his players and recruiting." 289
While it was customary for members of the team to attend a pre-season camp,
280. 535 U.S. 1054 (2002).
281. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 529 (M.D.N.C. 2001). While Title IX allows a
school to provide separate teams for contact sports, such as football, it is not uncommon for New
York high school football teams to have female place kickers, as the state regulations are more
favorable to allowing females to participate on certain contact sports where they have satisfied that
they are physically able. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 8, § 135.4(c)(7) (2003). There have
been female place kickers at Valley Stream Central High School and Hewlett High School in Nassau
County, New York.
282. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 530-31.
286. Id. at 531.
287. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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that summer the coach did not allow Mercer to attend.290 The coach called the
coed and asked her why she was still interested in football and apparently
suggested she should instead be competing in beauty pageants.2 91 There were
other things, such as sending a letter to members of the team with the
salutation of "men," and a meeting with the student and her mother concerning
her status on the team, to which the coach allegedly informed them it was the
worst decision of his life and that Mercer should instead try-out for the
cheerleading team.292 At this meeting, Mercer was also informed that she
would not be issued a uniform or pads for the coming season, including
practices, and would not be allowed to dress or even stand with the team.293
On August 25, 1995, the university's sports information director issued a
press release indicating Mercer was not on the active roster. 294 Apparently, no
other member of the football team had ever received this designation.295 After
the issuance of this statement, Mercer was requested to meet with the press,
which she was reluctant to do, but was informed it was part of her obligation
to the team.296 She read a statement summarizing certain alleged statements
made by the coach and indicating that she would essentially be treated like an
injured player.297 She concluded, "I regret to say it, but it is a fiction that I am
a member of the Duke football team. I believe that if I were a man and had the
same kicking skills that I have now, I would be a member of the Duke football
team... ."298 The next fall, the coach informed Mercer there was no place for
her on the team. It was reported that no member of the team had ever been
dismissed by the coach for performance reasons. 299 That winter, she was
prohibited from participating in winter conditioning sessions. 300 Obviously,
the football coach was aware of what was going on.
During the spring of 1997, Mercer's attorney contacted the university's
attorney, concerning the treatment she received, and indicated his client's
desire to meet with a university official. Both the university's president and
athletic director declined this request. The university's attorney apparently
290. Id. at 531.
291. Id. at 532.
292. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
293. Id. at 532. She was the only member of the team not issued a uniform or pads that season.
Id. at 533.
294. Id. at 532.
295. Id. at 533.
296. Id.
297. Mercer, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 532-33.
298. Id. at 533.
299. Id. at 534.
300. Id. at 533.
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met with the football coach, the team trainer, and perhaps the kicking coach,
concluding there was no validity to Mercer's claim.301
Mercer then commenced a lawsuit against the university predicated on
violation of Title IX, in Mercer v. Duke University.30 2 Initially, the North
Carolina District Court granted the University's motion for summary
judgment. 303 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with this determination, finding
that the denial of a member of one sex to compete on a coed team must be
balanced with the first subpart of the "Athletics" regulation, which prohibited
the discrimination on the basis of sex.304 The appellate court stated, "Where,
as here, however, the university invites women into what appellees
characterize as the 'traditionally all-male bastion of collegiate football,' . . . we
are convinced that this reading of the regulation is the only one permissible
under law."30 5 On remand, the case received further media coverage with the
jury's verdict awarding Mercer $1.00 in compensatory damages and $2
million in punitive damages. The University challenged the verdict; however,
the district court granted a final judgment sanctioning the monetary awards
rendered by the jury. 306 A further appeal was pursued, where "the Fourth
301. Id.
302. 32 F. Supp. 2d 836 (M.D.N.C. 1998) [hereinafter Mercer I] (granting the university
summary judgment), rev'd & remanded, 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Mercer II], on
remand, 181 F. Supp. 2d 525 (M.D.N.C. 2001) [hereinafter Mercer III] (upholding monetary
damages), vacated in part, 50 Fed. Appx. 643 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 2002) (unreported decision)
(surprisingly this decision was not selected for inclusion in the Federal Reporter) [hereinafter Mercer
IV] (prohibiting punitive damages in Title IX actions). See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note
1, at 564-66. During September 1999, Katie Hnida became the first female to dress for a NCAA
Division I-A football game for the University of Colorado, although she did not get into the game.
Sports Shorts: Duke Must Pay $2M to Female Kicker, N.Y. POST, Oct. 13, 2000, at 86. Two years
later, during August 2001, another placekicker, Ashley Martin, entered the record books when she
became the first female to score a point in a Division I football game, when she kicked two extra
points for Jacksonville State University. Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 565. During
2003, the University of Minnesota refused to allow Mary Nystrom to tryout for the NCAA Division I
men's football team. Sports Flash, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), April 19, 2003, at A29.
303. Mercer 1, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 837. See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 1(a).
304. Mercer II, 190 F.3d at 647-648. The court stated:
We therefore construe the second sentence of subsection (b) as providing that in non-contact sports, but
not in contact sports, covered institutions must allow members of an excluded sex to try out for single-sex
teams. Once an institution has allowed a member of one sex to try out for a team operated by the
institution for the other sex in a contact sports, subsection (b) is simply no longer applicable, and the
institution is subject to the general anti-discrimination provision of subsection (a).
Id. at 647-48 (emphasis added). The district court in Mercer Ill stated, "[O]nce a member of the
opposite sex is given the opportunity to participate on a same-sex contact sports team, that member of
the opposite sex must be treated equally and given the same types of opportunities that other members
of the team are given." Mercer 1II, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
305. Mercer II, 190 F.3d at 648.
306. Mercer 1I, 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, vacated in part, Mercer IV, 50 Fed. Appx. at 643.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
Circuit ruled that punitive damages were not recoverable in a Title IX
action." 307
However, the decision is noteworthy because the district court, in its
second decision, expounded on the notice provision. Initially, the North
Carolina District Court concluded the female student-athlete had properly
placed the university on notice in conformity with the Gebser standard. 30 8
While it was undisputed among the parties that both the university president
and athletic director would be deemed appropriate persons,309 the university
contested whether these individuals had been placed on notice, as Mercer did
not complain to any official at the university about the discrimination,
specifically either the president or athletic director. Interestingly, this
represents the first judicial opinion to so rule that an athletic director would be
deemed an appropriate individual. More significantly, the court allowed a
wide latitude as to how the "appropriate persons" came to have such notice,
stating:
[I]n order for institutional liability to arise under the Gebser standard,
the university official must simply have actual knowledge of the
alleged discrimination, as opposed to having mere constructive
knowledge of it .... The source of the information, therefore, is
immaterial to the analysis of whether liability attaches. It is not
necessary in this case to undergo an extensive fact analysis of whether
the requisite officials for Defendant had actual knowledge of Mercer's
claim of gender discrimination because both [the University president]
and Athletic Director. .. admitted during trial that they were actually
aware of Plaintiffs claim of gender discrimination. 310
Thus, it appears the aggrieved individual would need not personally
inform the appropriate person, only that that the appropriate person somehow
came to know the information. Herein, it was clear that Mercer did not
personally inform either the university president or athletic director. This
court also found the University's response could equate with deliberate
indifference. 311
Secondarily, in examining the second area of the Gebser decision, the
court concluded that the football coach was deemed an official with policy-
making authority, 312 another groundbreaking determination. The court
307. Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 565 (referring to Mercer IV).
308. Mercer III, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 539-40.
309. Id. at 540.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 542.
312. Id. at 543.
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opined, "In essence, this means that an individual may be considered a policy-
making official if the individual speaks with final policy-making authority for
the defendant institution concerning the action alleged to have caused the
violation of Title IX." 313 Herein, the football coach had authority to make
final decisions as to the composition of the team.3 14  Query, whether
satisfaction of only this second aspect would have been sufficient for a Title
IX plaintiff to go forward? The University's appeal concentrated on the
issuance of punitive damages, and so the Fourth Circuit, in its second review
of the case, did not address the Gebser notice issue.315
3. Addendum
The Grandson opinion raises more questions than it answers. Did
Grandson ever communicate with her coach about the alleged inequities in the
women's athletic program at the university? Did she ever communicate with
the athletic director? The Eighth Circuit did not elucidate whether the athletic
director or any of the assistant athletic directors on their own volition were
aware of the inequities pertaining to the issuing of athletic scholarships vis-b-
vis the percentage of athletic scholarships issued for members of one sex
compared to the percentage of student-athletes of that sex. It was clear, as of
1998, that the OCR would only tolerate a difference of one percent in the
comparison or the difference of one scholarship. The court did opine that a
university has a certain flexibility in phasing in scholarships as new teams are
added. Should this tolerant approach be allowed thirty-one years after Title
IX's enactment?
The Mercer decision is extremely noteworthy for three reasons: first, it
clearly embraces that a coach can be an educational employee charged with
making official policy decisions; secondly, it does not matter how the
"appropriate person" came to have knowledge of the alleged sexual
harassment, only that it does come to the individual's attention; and thirdly,
that an athletic director will be deemed an "appropriate person."
However, to argue that schools do not have knowledge of Title IX
violations in the post-Gebser era for the following situations, is preposterous:
schools that eliminate teams for one sex, where satisfaction of the effective
accommodation test is not satisfied (the percentage for students of that sex is
not substantially proportional to the percentage for student-athletes of that sex,
there has been no continuing expansion of teams and opportunities for the
313. Mercer 1II, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
314. Id.
315. See generally, Mercer IV, 50 Fed. Appx. 643.
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disadvantaged sex, and the current program does not fully and effectively
accommodate the interests of members of the disadvantaged sex);316 schools
that have not elevated club teams to varsity status where the school is not in
compliance with the effective accommodation test;317 schools that do not have
"substantial" proportionality between the percentage of athletic scholarships
for one sex compared to the percentage of student-athletes of that sex;318 and
cases where members of only one sex are relegated to inferior off-school
grounds athletic facilities.319
VI. CONCLUSION
Claims of sexual harassment have increased dramatically in the last
decade. While Title IX has theoretically provided another avenue to seek
316. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c); Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979);
Policy Clarification (Jan. 16, 1996). The effective accommodation test used to determine compliance
with the first program area of the equal opportunity subpart of the Title IX regulations has been
approved by every federal circuit court of appeals to be presented with the issue, including the First
Circuit in Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (seeking the retention of two
women's varsity teams, gymnastics and volleyball; granting the female student-athletes a preliminary
injunction against the University); Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (granting
the plaintiffs a permanent injunction against the University), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); the
Third Circuit in Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (successfully
seeking the retention of two women's varsity teams); the Sixth Circuit in Miami University Wrestling
Club v. Miami University (Ohio), 802 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2002) (unsuccessfully seeking the retention
of the men's wrestling team); and Homer v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass 'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th
Cir. 1994); the Seventh Circuit in Boulahanis v. Board of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1284 (2000); and Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 1128 (1994) (unsuccessfully sought the retention of the men's swimming team where
the first prong of the effective accommodation test was met); the Eighth Circuit in Chalenor v.
University of North Dakota, 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002) (unsuccessfully seeking the retention of
the men's wrestling team, where the first prong of the effective accommodation test was met); the
Ninth Circuit in Neal v. Bd. of Tr., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999) (unsuccessfully sought the retention
of the men's varsity wrestling team where the first prong of the effective accommodation test was
met); and the Tenth Circuit in Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824 (10th
Cir. 1993) (successfully seeking the retention of the women's softball team at Colorado State
University, which was slated for elimination), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993). The Fifth Circuit
embraced the effective accommodation test, infra. See Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at
568-69, 572-73, 585 (discussing the cases).
317. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000) (successfully seeking the
elevation of two women's club teams, soccer and softball, to varsity teams).
318. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c); OCR Guidance Letter, supra note 202.
319. See, e.g., Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 132 F. Supp. 2d 958 (M.D. Fla. 2000)
(girls' high school softball team played on municipal baseball fields, rather than fields set for softball
dimensions, while the boys' baseball team played on baseball diamonds on the school grounds).
There were other inequities for the girls' softball teams, concerning the "electronic scoreboards,
batting cages, bleachers, signs, concession stand, press box, bathroom facilities and field lighting."
Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 581.
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redress for sexual harassment, the parameters have yet to be decisively
revealed. The 1992 Supreme Court decision in Franklin led to the conclusion
that a prospective plaintiff could assert a claim for sexual harassment against
an educational institution that was a recipient of federal funds; however, the
standard to be applied and even whether this extended to claims predicated
upon actions of students, remains unclear.
There were some signposts issued. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District, the Supreme Court advised the nation that liability will not be
imposed against the educational institution for the intentional actions of its
employees in a teacher-student sexual harassment case unless the institution
had actual notice of the misconduct and exhibited deliberate indifference to
such conduct. The Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board
of Education likewise allowed for a Title IX peer sexual harassment action,
but also imposed an exacting standard to find any liability against the
educational institution. The clarity required to know what individuals must be
informed, what notice must be given to be deemed sufficient notice, and what
actions the education institution must take to avoid a charge of deliberate
indifference, require further amplification.
It remains to be seen what the parameters will be as to whom will be the
appropriate person to alert of the offensive conduct. Omitting classroom
teachers and coaches from the paradigm would be dramatic in insulating the
educational institutions from Title IX culpability. Such a red light-green light
application appears unsightly when dealing with minors. Some of the facts
found within are especially disconcerting as it appears that school districts
were rewarded for failure of other teachers or principals not to put the school
board members on notice of the offending actions.
Despite the passage of thirty years, it took more than a quarter-century to
learn what standards would be applied in the sexual harassment context.
The reality is that for all practical purposes it is a student's teacher who is
their supervisor. It should be enough for any student to inform a teacher, as
one would expect that it would be within the duties and responsibilities of that
teacher to alert their superiors, even if it is merely the department chair, who
would likewise be responsible to inform his or her superior, the principal or
head of the post-secondary institution, who would then be required to place the
respective boards on notice. In the Title VII employment context, an adult is
not required to inform the board members of corporations of sexual
harassment nor even the chief executive officer. Query, why should a tougher
standard be imposed on students? This is especially vexing when under Title
IX it is the educational institution that receives federal funds in exchange for
one condition, the requirement that they do not engage in sex discrimination.
It is remarkable that despite the intervention of thirty years, the discourse of
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Title IX's application to sexual harassment has essentially only begun in
earnest since the late 1990's and the legal bar has been set at an extremely
high level. How much higher remains to be seen. On the collegiate level, the
NCAA should take the lead in implementing a sexual harassment policy for its
member colleges and universities.
With traditional Title IX athletics claims of sex discrimination, it is
submitted that any prerequisite notice provision should, if required, be deemed
satisfied as therein the actions of the athletic department -as carried out by the
athletic directors or coaches- represent the official policy of that educational
institution. The thirty-year history of individuals seeking redress for claims of
Title IX sex discrimination within athletic departments is one replete with
legal minefields placed along the way, including: the extension of compliance
with the 1975 regulations until the issuance of the 1979 Policy Interpretation
and the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Grove City College v. Bell,320
effectively nullifying the statute's application to athletic department programs
and activities, which took four years for Congress to finally rectify over a
presidential veto by passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (1988
amendments).3 2 1 On the plus side, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals were
uniform in their embrace of the effective accommodation test. However,
whether the judiciary will require a condition precedent notice requirement in
order to pursue a regular Title IX athletics case just represents another uphill
climb in the long race to achieve gender equity in the nation's schools.
320. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
321. 20 U.S.C. § 1687, 102 Stat. 28, Pub. L. 100-259 (1988).
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